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CATALYZING PRIVACY LAW 
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The United States famously lacks a comprehensive federal data privacy law. In the past 
year, however, over half the states have proposed broad privacy bills or have established task 
forces to propose possible privacy legislation. Meanwhile, congressional committees are holding 
hearings on multiple privacy bills. What is catalyzing this legislative momentum? Some 
believe that Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force 
in 2018, is the driving factor. But with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 
which took effect in January 2020, California has emerged as an alternate contender in the 
race to set the new standard for privacy. 
Our close comparison of the GDPR and California’s privacy law reveals that the 
California law is not GDPR-lite: it retains a fundamentally American approach to 
information privacy. Reviewing the literature on regulatory competition, we argue that 
California, not Brussels, is catalyzing privacy law across the United States. And what is 
happening is not a simple story of powerful state actors. It is more accurately characterized as 
the result of individual networked norm entrepreneurs, influenced and even empowered by 
data globalization. Our study helps explain the puzzle of why Europe’s data privacy 
approach failed to spur US legislation for over two decades. Finally, our study answers 
critical questions of practical interest to individuals—who will protect my privacy?—and to 
businesses—whose rules should I follow? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) took effect in 
May 2018, it positioned the European Union as the world’s privacy champion.1 
A flurry of emails updating privacy policies landed in inboxes across the globe, 
attesting to the international reach of the European rule. A month later, 
California passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”), establishing 
the nation’s most stringent omnibus privacy protections, effective as of 
January 1, 2020.2 California, the home of many of the world’s largest data-
based enterprises, had emerged as a dark horse contender in the privacy 
regulator race. Then, in the past year, state after state considered broad data 
privacy legislation,3 and eleven comprehensive federal privacy bills were 
introduced in Congress.4 
What is catalyzing U.S. privacy law? The conventional wisdom holds that 
Europe is setting the global standard for information privacy. There is much 
truth to this—countries such as Nigeria have joined to make 142 countries and 
counting with a broad privacy law, often modeled closely on the GDPR.5 
Scholars writing insightfully about the global race to information privacy have 
 
1 Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., a New Privacy Law, Makes Europe World’s Leading Tech Watchdog, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/24/technology/europe-
gdpr-privacy.html. 
2  See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Silicon Valley Faces Regulatory Fight on Its Home Turf, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/business/california-data-privacy-
ballot-measure.html; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et 
seq. (2018). 
3 See infra Section III(B)(1). 
4 See S. 1214: Privacy Bill of Rights Act (Sen. Edward Markey); S. 189: Social Media Privacy 
Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2019 (Sen. Amy Klobuchar); S. 806: Own Your Own 
Data Act (Sen. John Kennedy); H.R. 1282: Data Accountability and Trust Act (Rep. Bobby 
Rush); H.R. 2013: Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act (Rep. Suzan 
DelBene); H.R. 4978: Online Privacy Act (Reps. Anna Eshoo and Zoe Lofgren); S.1116: 
Balancing the Rights Of Web Surfers Equally and Responsibly Act (Sen. Blackburn); S. 142: 
American Data Dissemination (ADD) Act (Sen. Marco Rubio); Consumer Online Privacy 
Rights Act (Sen. Cantwell); S.1578: Do Not Track Act (Sen. Hawley); S.1951: Designing 
Accounting Safeguards to Help Broaden Oversight and Regulations on Data Act (Sens. 
Hawley & Warner). See also S.3744: Data Care Act of 2018 (Sen. Brian Schatz); Sen. Ron 
Wyden’s Consumer Data Protection Act (Nov. 2018); Sens. Markey & Blumenthal’s 
CONSENT Act (Apr. 2018). 
5 The exact number of countries with comprehensive data protection laws depends on 
one’s characterization of any particular law. While Graham Greenleaf identifies 142 countries 
and jurisdictions with such laws, Article 19 counts 130. The most recent laws are modeled on 
the GDPR. See, e.g., Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019, https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/NigeriaDataProtectionRegulation.pdf. Among other differences, 
the Nigerian law permits fines up to two percent of global turnover, not the four percent 
permitted by the GDPR. 
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tracked the spread of data privacy laws across the world, noting Europe’s 
influence on these developments.6 In a recent article, Paul Schwartz observes 
that the European Union pioneered international privacy law to enable 
commerce across the European Union itself.7 He argues that other countries 
have largely adopted the European Union’s data privacy model, reflecting its 
“success in the marketplace of ideas.”8  
Schwartz cites the CCPA as an example of Europe’s success.9 Journalists 
reporting on the CCPA’s enactment, too, have frequently referred to it as 
“GDPR-lite”10 and “California’s Version of GDPR.”11 And as the push for 
federal legislation intensifies, many characterize it as a national response to the 
GDPR.12 
This Article challenges this emerging consensus. Despite decades of 
European privacy law, the United States showed little appetite until now for 
broad privacy legislation. Instead, norm entrepreneurs in California helped 
establish a new privacy framework that, as we show, differs significantly and 
consciously from the European model. Our close comparison of the new 
California and European laws reveals that the CCPA is not simply the GDPR-
lite—it is both more and less demanding on various points. It offers a 
fundamentally different regime for data privacy. And the numerous legislative 
proposals in state houses show greater fealty to California’s model than to the 
 
6 Graham Greenleaf, Global Convergence of Data Privacy Standards and Laws: Speaking Notes for 
the European Commission Events on the Launch of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 
Brussels & New Delhi, 25 May 2018, 18-56 UNSW L. RES. PAPER 8 Pages Posted, 3 (May 24, 
2018). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3184548. 
7 Paul Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 NYU L. REV. 771, 810 (2019) (“Its 
power in this regard first developed in response to issues that it faced internally. It needed to 
harmonize the data processing practices of EU Member States. The inward-facing elements of 
EU data protection law then became an important factor in its adaptability to the rest of the 
world. Here is a global diffusion story that begins with a response to internal political 
considerations.”). Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338954. 
8 Id. at 818. 
9 Id. at 816 (“Ideas matter. Even though the adequacy requirement provides an impressive 
fulcrum for international influence, the global success of EU data protection is also 
attributable to the sheer appeal of high standards for data protection. This appeal cannot alone 
be explained by the force of EU market power or even specific EU negotiating strategies. To 
illustrate, this Article can point to an example from the United States, namely, the enactment 
of the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) of 2018.”). 
10 See, e.g., Kayvan Alikhani, Regulatory Disruption: Is Your Business Ready to Comply with the 
CCPA?, FORBES (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/06/06/regulatory-disruption-is-your-
business-ready-to-comply-with-the-ccpa/#e5a21e545ee6 
11 See, e.g., George P. Slefo, Marketers and Tech Companies Confront California’s Version of 
GDPR, ADAGE (June 29, 2018), https://adage.com/article/digital/california-passed-version-
gdpr/314079. 
12 See, e.g., Elizabeth Schulze, The US wants to copy Europe’s strict data privacy law- but only some of 
it, CNBC (May 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/gdpr-one-year-on-ceos-
politicians-push-for-us-federal-privacy-law.html. 
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European antecedent. Bills pending before Congress reflect pressure not from 
Brussels, but from Sacramento. Thus, California has emerged as a kind of 
privacy superregulator, catalyzing privacy law in the United States. A 
subnational jurisdiction, California—itself driven by networked individuals—is 
now driving privacy in a significant part of the world, seeming to rival the 
influence of a supranational jurisdiction, the European Union. The emergence 
of the CCPA demonstrates the central role of local networks and norm 
entrepreneurship, contesting on the ground of what we call “data 
globalization.”13 
We are thus witnessing a paradigm shift in the policy conversation around 
data privacy law. Until now, the rules of transatlantic privacy rested on 
awkward negotiated mechanisms to transfer data between two purportedly 
irreconcilable regimes.14 Now we are witnessing what might be characterized as 
a regulatory race on both sides of the ocean.15 This Article is the first to 
critically evaluate the relationship between California’s privacy law, Europe’s 
data protection regulation, and possible future state and federal privacy law.16  
This study is also of great practical interest, answering twin questions for 
individuals and businesses alike: For businesses, whose laws should I follow? 
For individuals, who will protect my privacy? Answering Studying these 
questions leads, in turn, to another set of inquiries about the ways  catalysis 
from the GDPR and CCPA govern privacy outside either Europe or 
California. When Europe’s laws meet California’s, who wins? If indeed 
European or Californian regulation will be applied globally de facto, why then 
should anyone else legislate?  
 The answers to these questions have implications not only for the shape of 
information privacy law, but for understanding inter-jurisdictional regulatory 
 
13 See infra note 210 and accompanying text. 
14 See Paul M. Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United States Data 
Protection 1 (1996); Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, 
Electronic Commerce, and the Europrean Privacy Directive app. A at 213 (1998). But see Kenneth 
A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
247, 281 (2011) (arguing that the regimes are more similar than different in practice). See also 
William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 1025 (2016) 
(demonstrating similarities in enforcement despite differences in the law on the books). 
15 See, e.g., Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy Laws (1), 
BLOOMBERG LAW (last updated Feb. 6, 2019, 3:02 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-
push-for-consumer-privacy-laws-1. 
16 The focus of our study is on regulation of the data protection practices of private parties, 
rather than on the protection of privacy against intrusions by the state—on the regulation of 
“surveillance capitalism” rather than on more traditional state surveillance. See 
Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 
30 J. INFO TECH. 75, 75 (2015) (defining “surveillance capitalism” as a “new form of 
information capitalism [that] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to 
produce revenue and market control”). 
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dynamics in the digital economy. While data shares some characteristics with 
cars, pollution, and corporate charters—all the subject of prior 
globalizations—it also differs because of its simultaneous global and 
instantaneous effects:data disobeys borders and operates at internet speed. 
Equally important, the answers to these questions shed light on the prospects 
of countries across the world as they vie for advantage in the information age. 
Ultimately, this story of privacy catalysis tests the operation of both federalism 
and international regulatory competition in the twenty-first century. . 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I situates our discussion of 
regulatory catalysis in data privacy within the broader frame of the theory of 
regulatory competition, borrowing lessons from areas such as corporate and 
environmental law. Part II compares the substance of the GDPR and the 
CCPA, and the ways in which their structures promote catalysis in other 
jurisdictions. Part III turns to the race for data privacy law. We are the first to 
disentangle the catalytic effects on U.S. federal and state laws coming from 
both Brussels and Sacramento, and to show that the resulting proposals are 
distinctly American and owe a greater debt to the CCPA than to the GDPR. 
As it once did with pioneering environmental regulation, California has 
emerged as a superregulator again, this time with respect to the information 
age. 
 
I. SUPERREGULATORS 
 
US privacy law can be periodized as follows: pre-CCPA and post-CCPA. 
Until the CCPA, no state or federal statute in the United States imposed 
privacy protections across all industry sectors and technologies in the manner 
that European data protection law had done for decades. After the CCPA, 
Congress and state legislatures across the country saw a huge rush of legislative 
activity around data privacy. 
What is prompting this new interest in privacy lawmaking in the United 
States? Many point to the GDPR. After all, the GDPR went into effect in May 
2018 to much fanfare. Countries around the world changed their laws to 
conform more closely with the GDPR, drawn by hopes of achieving a finding 
of “adequacy” which would facilitate their data trade with European 
economies.17 The GDPR also prompted global companies to establish 
expensive compliance programs and infrastructure. It makes sense, at first 
glance, to think that Europe has, through the GDPR, driven U.S. states and 
the federal government to take privacy seriously at last.  If so, this 
development would fit neatly with the larger phenomenon that Anu Bradford 
labels the “Brussels Effect.”18 But if this is the case, why did it take so long?19 
 
17 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 783. 
18 Mark Scott & Laurens Cerulus, Europe’s new data protection rules export privacy standards 
worldwide, POLITICO (Jan. 31 2018), https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-data-protection-
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Bradford, after all, coined the phrase in 2012, describing a EU directive 
promulgated in 1995. If European law prompted soul-searching among 
American lawmakers, its voyage across the Atlantic proved quite slow. 
This Part summarizes overlapping theories of regulatory competition and 
catalysis, drawn from varied subject matter areas, including corporate and 
environmental law. In all of these domains, early claims of a race to the 
bottom spurred by globalization have been challenged by scholars who 
suggested alternative regulatory dynamics that might lead to a race to the top, 
or a race to the optimum.20 Often these effects are named for the places where 
they were first detected: Delaware, California, or Brussels. In different ways, 
these three jurisdictions have emerged as “superregulators.” Later in the 
Article we will consider which of these superregulator effects have catalyzed 
data privacy rules across the United States. 
 
A. The Delaware Effect  
 
Regulatory competition has been investigated in greatest depth in 
corporate law.21 An early view argued that corporations would charter 
themselves in the most permissive state, leading U.S. states to compete with 
each other to offer ever more lax corporate law.22 Some dubbed this the 
“Delaware Effect,” because two thirds of all Fortune 500 companies are 
incorporated in that state.23 
A critical legal rule made regulatory competition possible. State laws defer 
to a corporation’s decision on its state of incorporation—known as the 
“internal affairs” doctrine.24 Thus, a corporation operating principally in 
 
privacy-standards-gdpr-general-protection-data-regulation/. 
19 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012) (describing spread of 
EU-style privacy protections in the wake of the EU’s 1995 Data Protection Directive). 
20 Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977) (“competitive legal systems should tend toward optimality so far 
as the shareholders' relationship to the corporation is concerned”). 
21 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE 
L.J. 663, 664 (1974).  
22 Justice Louis Brandeis explained the liberalization of corporate law through this dynamic: 
“Lesser states, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had removed 
safeguards from their own incorporation laws. Companies were early formed to provide 
charters for corporations in states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive…. 
The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.” Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 
557–60, 53 S. Ct. 481, 493–94 (1933). 
23 See Del. Div. of Corps., Annual Report Statistics (FY 2018), DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://corp.delaware.gov/stats/. And this does not apply only to large established 
corporations: in 2017, over 80% of initial public offerings in the U.S. used Delaware as a 
corporate home. Id. 
24 VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) 
(“It has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in one State will as a 
general rule decline to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the management of 
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California or Kansas can incorporate in Delaware and be assured that relations 
between its shareholders, directors, and officers will be governed by Delaware 
law. Without this “internal affairs” rule, a corporation might have to conform 
to the corporate law of all of the jurisdictions in which it operates. The internal 
affairs doctrine thus allows a company to establish a single regulator for the 
corporate law affairs of the corporation.25  
The classic analyses posited that Delaware had cornered the market for 
incorporations through dubious efforts to favor corporate officers and 
directors.26 Ralph Winter famously rejected this claim of an inevitable race to 
the bottom. Winter argued that corporate leaders were not in fact free to 
choose the most permissive jurisdiction, because shareholders would penalize 
them for failing to maximize shareholder value.27 Where some had derided 
Delaware’s efforts as “law for sale,”28 Roberta Romano argued that Delaware’s 
efforts were part of the genius of American law. Instead of seeking to race to 
the bottom to attract corporate charters, Delaware courts, for their part, saw 
their role as providing special corporate law expertise. As one Delaware 
Chancery Court judge noted, “Delaware has a substantial interest in providing 
 
the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state but will leave 
controversies as to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile.”); Rogers v. Guar. 
Tr. Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a long-
standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state should have the authority 
to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-the state of incorporation.”). 
25 With respect to corporate law, the European Union did not embrace a similar approach 
to that in the United States until recently. Rather than deferring to the state of incorporation, 
many EU states sought to establish where the “real seat” of the corporation lay. Such an 
approach would not defer to the mailbox incorporation available in Delaware. It This rule 
would still typically result in a single regulator—but this it would make gaming the law more 
difficult. One would actually have to locate one’s headquarters (the management and control 
center) in the jurisdiction with the friendliest laws, rather than simply fill out some forms to 
incorporate via a mailbox. Recent EU caselaw has, however, moved towards the U.S. internal 
affairs rule, deferring to the jurisdiction of the state of incorporation. This opens up the 
possibility of regulatory competition for corporate law in Europe as well. 
26 William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 
(1974). According to this view, states such as Delaware might wish to attract incorporations 
because of the franchise tax—the annual fees they pay to maintain their incorporation in that 
state. Indeed, Delaware would come to fund one-quarter of its budget through this means. 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 24 
(2012) (noting that “Delaware generates $740–800 million per year in franchise taxes, which 
amounts to a quarter of the state’s budget”); Financial Overview (FY 2018), DELAWARE.GOV, 
https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2018/documents/operating/financial-overview.pdf 
(estimating franchise taxes of $975.0 million for Fiscal Year 2017 and $992.6 million for Fiscal 
Year 2018). 
27 Ralph Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 251, 257 (1977) (“If management is to secure initial capital ... it must attract investors 
away from the almost infinite variety of competing opportunities”). 
28 Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 
861 (1969). 
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an effective forum for litigating disputes involving the internal affairs of 
Delaware corporations.”29 Regulatory competition, seen from this perspective, 
can occur not just through the content of the governing rules, but also through 
the quality of their adjudication. 
The Delaware Effect therefore can be summarized as the emergence of 
certain jurisdictions as highly influential overseers of particular behavior based 
on proactive elections made by regulated entities—an opt-in to a particular 
jurisdiction. Both the substantive law and the regulatory techniques of those 
jurisdictions may then gain influence outside its borders, as other regulators 
defer to them. While this arrangement could result in a race to the bottom, it 
could also enable the emergence of highly specialized regulatory oversight that 
then becomes the standard to which other jurisdictions defer.  
 
B. The California Effect 
 
David Vogel famously challenged a similar hypothesis of a race to the 
bottom in environmental regulation and consumer protection law. Where 
many argued that international trade would inevitably lead to the erosion of 
consumer and environmental regulation, Vogel countered that “under certain 
circumstances, global economic integration can actually lead to the 
strengthening of consumer and environmental standards.”30 Instead of a race 
to the bottom (what he called a “Delaware Effect”) he offered that regulatory 
competition might result in a “California Effect,” demonstrating “the critical 
role of powerful and wealthy ‘green’ political jurisdictions in promoting a 
regulatory ‘race to the top’ among their trading partners.”31 Unlike the 
Delaware Effect, in which a jurisdiction tempts companies to opt in to its 
regulatory scheme and other jurisdictions then defer to that one’s expertise, 
the California Effect occurs when one jurisdiction pushes other jurisdictions to 
improve their own laws. This race to the top is de jure in nature, rather than de 
facto or deferential; other jurisdictions pass laws that mimic the superregulator 
jurisdiction. 
Vogel identified three conditions under which a California effect might 
 
29 In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2014). For support for this 
statement, Vice Chancellor Laster cited Roberta Romano’s book The Genius of American 
Corporate Law: “The most important transaction-specific asset in the chartering relation is an 
intangible asset, Delaware's reputation for responsiveness to corporate concerns,” which stems 
from “a comprehensive body of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, and 
administrative expertise in the rapid processing of corporate filings.” ROBERTO ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 38–39 (1993). 
30  DAVID VOGEL & ROBERT KAGAN, DYNAMICS OF REGULATORY CHANGE HOW 
GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES (2004); DAVID VOGEL, 
TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 
(Harvard U. Press 1995) (hereinafter “VOGEL, TRADING UP”). 
31 VOGEL, TRADING UP, supra note 30, at 6.. 
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occur.32 First, a race to the top is more likely to be triggered if the standards 
are supported by a coalition joining public interest groups with regulated 
companies that wish to impose the same regulatory costs on their competitors 
in other jurisdictions. Second, the superregulator must have a large market that 
is sufficiently attractive that companies would rather absorb the cost of 
regulation than forego the market. Third, a race to the top is more likely to 
occur if there is a strong institution capable of harmonizing standards across 
jurisdictions, such as the U.S. federal government or the EU. 
The classic example of the California Effect is California’s emissions 
regulations for automobiles. As Ann Carlson explains, from the mid-1960s 
onward, the state pioneered strong tailpipe emissions standards.33 When 
Congress amended the Clean Air Act to preempt state standards for emissions, 
it grandfathered in “any state” that had emissions controls in place prior to 
March 30, 1966—a standard applicable only to California.34 The Clean Air Act 
of 1970 explicitly recognized California as a superregulator: it became the only 
state allowed set stricter-than-federal standards, and other states could then 
opt to follow California’s standards.35 Twelve eastern states and the District of 
Columbia announced in 1994 that they would follow California.36 Auto 
emissions rules illustrate all three of Vogel’s conditions. 
The mechanism of the California Effect differs from the Delaware Effect. 
Under the Delaware Effect, a second jurisdiction defers to the regulatory 
choices of the superregulator, magnifying the impact of those choices. Under 
the California Effect, other jurisdictions themselves adopt the same rules as 
the superregulator jurisdiction.  
 
C. The Brussels Effect 
 
The formation of the European Union in the late twentieth century saw 
the emergence of another superregulator: Brussels, the seat of the EU 
bureaucracy. As Anu Bradford vividly describes it: “Few Americans are aware 
that EU regulations determine the makeup they apply in the morning, the 
 
32  VOGEL, TRADING UP, supra note 30 at 260–68. See also Sebastiaan Princen, Trading up in 
the Transatlantic Relationship, 24 J. PUB. POL. 127, 128 (2004). 
33 Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1111 
(2009). 
34 Id. 
35 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“Other states could choose to follow either the federal or the California standards, but they 
could not adopt standards of their own.”); Carlson, supra note 33, at 1134; Nicholas Bryner & 
Meredith Hankins, Why California gets to write its own auto emissions standards: 5 questions answered, 
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 6, 2018), https://theconversation.com/why-california-gets-to-
write-its-own-auto-emissions-standards-5-questions-answered-94379. 
36 Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 82 (1996). 
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cereal they eat for breakfast, the software they use on their computer, and the 
privacy settings they adjust on their Facebook page. And that’s just before 8:30 
AM.”37  
Where the California Effect depends on jurisdictions racing to raise their 
regulations in response to each other, the Brussels Effect operates principally 
as a de facto mechanism, when market actors conform their global products to 
European rules.38 Bradford observes, “[T]he Brussels Effect is more about one 
jurisdiction’s ability to override others than it is about triggering an upward 
race.”39  
Why might a corporation change its practices outside Europe, adopting 
stricter codes absent legal compulsion? Bradford explains, “[M]ultinational 
corporations often have an incentive to standardize their production globally 
and adhere to a single rule.”40 Like Vogel, Bradford identifies conditions under 
which a Brussels Effect is more likely to occur.41 First, as with the California 
Effect, the Brussels Effect is likely to occur only when the unilateral regulator 
represents a large and attractive market. Second, that superregulator must have 
significant regulatory capacity, through which it tends to aim strict rules at 
“inelastic targets” such as consumer markets, thus creating rules that can’t be 
readily evaded.42 Third, the operations of the firm must be “nondivisible,” 
meaning that it is less costly for a firm to comply with the one higher standard 
worldwide than to set up different compliance standards. 
While the literature names certain cross-jurisdictional effects after 
particular superregulators who are especially likely to cause them, it is a 
mistake to overinterpret these names. As we shall see, superregulators can 
affect other jurisdictions in various ways. So, for example, when other nations 
adopt new data protection laws to harmonize their rules with those in the EU, 
this is a California Effect that happens to emanate from Brussels. When web 
sites began posting globally applicable privacy policies partly in response to a 
1990s California law requiring they do so, this was a Brussels Effect triggered 
by a California law. We will delve into these catalytic effects in privacy law 
more fully below. First, however, we explain the substance of the GDPR and 
the CCPA, showing that the differences between them mean there is more 
than one contender to be a data privacy superregulator.  
 
II. GDPR VERSUS CCPA 
 
 
37 Bradford, supra note 19.  
38 Id. at 4 (“Unilateral regulatory globalization occurs when a single state is able to 
externalize its laws and regulations outside its borders through market mechanisms, resulting 
in the globalization of standard Europe’s unilateral power to regulate global markets.”). 
39 Id. at 8. 
40 Id. at 6. 
41 Id. at 5. See also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 780. 
42 Bradford, supra note 37, at 5. 
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Which data privacy regime is driving the wave of legislative activity related 
to data privacy across the U.S., and what is the mechanism of that influence? 
To answer this question, we need first to understand the two regimes. This 
Part reveals both the similarities and differences between the GDPR and the 
CCPA. After all, if the CCPA can be described as a copy of the GDPR, then 
even if we can show that state legislators and Congress are copying California, 
Schwartz and others would be correct that the European Union is the ultimate 
source behind new U.S. privacy proposals. But if, as we argue, the CCPA is a 
fundamentally different regime—only similar to the GDPR at the surface, 
while lacking major structural elements of the GDPR—then the question of 
who the superregulator is becomes one with real consequences. 
A paperback of the GDPR runs some 130 pages, its sections literally 
divided into chapters.43 The CCPA, by contrast, runs around 25 pages. If the 
GDPR is a doctoral thesis, the CCPA is a term paper written the night before 
the deadline. 
In this Part, we compare the two regimes, addressing where they apply, 
whom they cover, and what they require. We also address differences in the 
regulatory style, enforcement mechanisms, and legal settings of the GDPR and 
the CCPA. This understanding of the two systems sets up our analysis in Part 
III, where we consider the influence of the new European and Californian 
laws across the United States. 
 
A. European Data Protection versus U.S. Consumer Protection  
 
First, it helps to understand the fundamental differences between a U.S.-
style and an E.U.-style data privacy regime. When discussing data governance, 
European lawyers do not even use the same language as American lawyers; 
they refer to statutes that govern the handling of personal data as “data 
protection” laws, not “privacy” laws.44 This reflects a fundamental difference 
in approach: “data protection” is universal in Europe, while most American 
law focuses on “consumer protection.”45 Data protection laws like the GDPR 
proceed from the principle that data protection is a fundamental human right 
safeguarded through constitutional protections in the European Convention 
 
43https://www.amazon.com/European-Data-Protection-Law-Regulation/dp/1533170835 
44 See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 115, 138, 147 (2017); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of 
Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004). See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting 
Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 
(1995); Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 905 (2009); CHRISTOPHER 
KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LAW: CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND REGULATION 
2–3 (2d ed. 2007). 
45 McGeveran, supra note 14, at 966 (“[D]ata protection law begins with an assumption that 
control over personal information is a human right…U.S. regulators, such as the FTC or state 
attorneys general, regulate privacy by policing the fairness of particular transactions”).  
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on Human Rights and the E.U. Charter. This places data protection rights on 
the same plane as free speech or due process.46 As a result, the default in 
Europe is that personal information cannot be collected or processed unless 
there is a specific legal justification for doing so.  
In the U.S., by contrast, privacy law usually follows a “consumer 
protection” model, with regulators focused on ensuring that consumers receive 
the benefit of their bargain in individual business-to-consumer transactions. 
The consumer protection model often relies on the much-criticized premise 
that disclosure and a right of refusal (so-called “notice and choice”) adequately 
empower consumers.47 Unlike a data protection regime, in which protections 
follow the data, the consumer protection model focuses on governing both a 
more discrete interaction and a more direct relationship. Until the CCPA, most 
American law presupposed that entities may collect and use personal data 
however they wish by default, unless a specific legal rule forbids a particular 
practice.  
A second difference between Europe and the United States is that U.S. 
privacy law has always been fragmented and “sectoral.”48 Different statutes are 
enforced by different regulators in different areas such as health care, financial 
services, education, or credit reporting. A few of these sectoral regimes are 
constructed like data protection rules, but they apply only within their narrow 
domains.49 Most U.S. laws function on the transactional consumer protection 
model described above. As a final backstop, general-purpose consumer 
protection regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state 
attorneys general address a subset of cases falling outside any sectoral rules, 
largely following a consumer protection model.50 By contrast, in every 
European nation, specialized data protection regulators have long enforced 
omnibus statutes applicable to all organizations when they handle any personal 
data. While these data protection laws contain extra protections for especially 
sensitive information, their basic human rights frameworks impose uniform 
requirements every time personal data is collected, processed, or transferred. 
These rules apply through sweeping definitions of “data controllers” and “data 
processors” that encompass not only businesses of every size and type but also 
governments, nonprofit organizations, political campaigns, and even 
 
46 European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Arts. 7, 8.  
47 See, e.g., WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE 
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 62-67 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 1904, 1930 (2013). 
48 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 505–06 (1995); Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, supra note 44. 
49 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 45 C.F.R. § Parts 160, 162, and 164; 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq.  
50 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 747 (2016). 
14 Catalyzing Privacy Law  
individuals—anyone engaged in the “processing” of personal data.51  
 
 
B. Substantive Similarities  
 
At first glance, the CCPA may seem more “European” than existing U.S. 
privacy laws. True, it is the first U.S. statute that has some data protection 
characteristics without being narrowly sectoral. For example, under the CCPA, 
legal protections follow personal data, regardless of whether an individual has 
a direct relationship with the regulated company. This differs from many 
existing regulatory models in the United States. For example, because the 
FTC’s general consumer protection authority focuses on the relationship 
between individuals and companies, it has little power over data brokers who 
obtain individual information from other companies or public sources rather 
than from consumers themselves.52 The CCPA directly regulates data brokers 
independent of their commercial relationships—a critical move targeting an 
industry that has great potential for abuse.53  
At first glance, too, some core elements of the CCPA echo aspects of the 
GDPR. Both laws define personal information very broadly, far beyond most 
existing U.S. privacy laws. Both laws foundationally emphasize transparency, 
reflecting the Fair Information Principles (FIPS) on which many data privacy 
regimes in both Europe and the U.S. are built. And both laws share the 
contours of a number of additional individual rights. 
In the past, narrow definitions of personal information have sharply 
limited the effect of many U.S. privacy laws.54 Under most U.S. laws, only 
 
51 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(2), 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) 
(hereinafter “GDPR”) (defining “processing” as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, 
such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction”). See Fashion ID 
GmbH & Co. KG v. Verbraucherzentrale NRW e.V., C-40/17 (July 29, 2019) (holding 
Facebook jointly responsible as a data controller when a third party website uses a Facebook 
“Like” button that facilitates user tracking). The first European Court of Justice case dealing 
with the GDPR’s predecessor, the Data Protection Directive, involved a criminal charge 
against an individual who had posted (seemingly innocuous) information about fellow 
parishioners to a webpage without their consent.  Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. 
Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R. I-12971. 
52 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability (2014).  
53 JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION 7 (2014) (“Stalkers and rogue employees have 
consistently found ways to abuse these databases.”). The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, a 
narrow sectoral statute, does regulate some segments of the data broker industry, but largely 
within the context of business relationships among credit reporting agencies and the lenders or 
employers who rely on their products. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
54  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
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certain types of defined information counted as personal data, making the 
definition limited, technical, and static. The GDPR and CCPA both break with 
this past by using the real-world potential for identifiability as the touchstone. 
The GDPR’s broad and open definition of personal data includes not just 
information that directly identifies a person, but also information that renders 
a person identifiable.55 The CCPA similarly applies to information that is 
“capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or 
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”56 Both laws provide 
expansive and open lists of examples of covered personal information, from 
IP addresses to biometric information. 
Another similarity between the GDPR and the CCPA is the central role of 
transparency. Transparency is a core principle of the GDPR.57 The GDPR’s 
recitals proclaim it a fundamental tenet of data protection law that people 
should know that their data have been collected, and be able to understand the 
extent to which that information is processed.58 The CCPA likewise focuses on 
giving people notice and access rights so that they can trace what is happening 
to their personal information. The California legislature’s articulated intent for 
the CCPA was to give consumers “an effective way to control their personal 
information” by giving them “[t]he right… to know what personal information 
is being collected about them,” and “[t]he right… to know whether their 
personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom.”59 
Beyond this hortatory language, both laws embed transparency principles 
in their requirements. Under the GDPR, organizations must provide 
individuals both notice and access. They must affirmatively provide detailed 
general notice that includes the purpose of data processing, the recipients of 
the data, the period for which the data will be stored, and other information.60 
Organizations that collect personal information from a third party must 
provide such notice as well.61 And all these disclosures must be clear and 
intelligible.62 The GDPR also establishes a right of individual access,63 building 
on “subject access rights” that have been in place at least since the 1990s 
throughout Europe under the Data Protection Directive.64  In response to an 
individual’s access request, data controllers must disclose, among other things: 
 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 1814 (2011). 
55 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 4(1). 
56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1). 
57 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 5(1)(a). 
58 GDPR, supra note 51, Recital 39. 
59 See Cal. A.B. 375 Sec. 2(i). 
60 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 13, 14. 
61 Id. art. 14(1)(d). 
62 Id. art. 12.  
63 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 15. 
64  Jef Ausloos & Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors. Data Subject Access Rights in 
Practice, INTERNATIONAL DATA PRIVACY LAW (2018) 8(1), pp.4–28. 
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the purposes of processing; the categories of personal information concerned; 
the recipients of personal data; retention or storage time; and the source of the 
data if they have not been collected from the individual.65 Additionally, they 
must provide a copy of the data itself, in a commonly used electronic form.66  
The CCPA likewise gives individuals both notice and access rights. Like 
the GDPR, it requires companies to disclose the purpose of processing, 
categories of information gathered, and the existence of individual rights with 
respect to that data (but not the recipients of the data or the storage period). 
This mandate goes well beyond notice requirements in prior U.S. law, such as 
a California statute requiring web sites to post privacy policies.67 And like the 
GDPR, the CCPA gives individuals access rights. The statute creates a right 
for consumers to request both the categories and specific pieces of personal 
information that a business has collected.68 Additionally, consumers have a 
right to request disclosure of the categories of sources from which the 
personal information is collected; the business or commercial purpose for 
collecting; and the categories of third parties with whom the business shares 
personal information.69 Unusually for a U.S. law, the rules apply not just to 
companies that have a direct relationship with the consumer, but also to 
companies that collect and sell personal information even if they obtain that 
information from somebody other than the consumer.70 This represents a 
significant advance from very limited rights under previous law, such as access 
to credit scoring information and the annual free credit report.71 
The two regimes share, too, the core elements of a number of additional 
individual rights (though they differ in the details): data portability, opt-out 
rights, a duty of nondiscrimination, and a right to deletion/erasure. The 
GDPR contains a right to data portability—that is, a right to receive one’s 
personal data in a format that enables an individual to switch service 
providers.72 This right is aimed at giving individuals more control over their 
data and more choices about IT services73 but is also understood to potentially 
 
65 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 15. 
66 Id. art. 15 (3). See also Rec. 63 (“Where possible, the controller should be able to provide 
remote access to a secure system which would provide the data subject with direct access to 
his or her personal data”). 
67 CAL. CIV. CODE § 22575.  
68 Id. at §§ 1798.100(a) and 1798.110(a). 
69 Id. at § 1798.110(a). 
70 Under the CCPA, consumers can request access to certain information from (a) a 
business that collects personal information and (b) a business that sells personal information 
or discloses it for a business purpose CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(a); 1798.110(a); 
1798.115(a). 
71 15 U.S.C. § 1681g. 
72 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 20, Recital 68; Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on the 
Right to Data Portability (2017) (hereafter “WP29 Portability Guidelines”). 
73 WP29 Portability Guidelines, supra note 72, at 3–4. 
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enhance competition.74 The CCPA quietly creates a data portability “right” of 
its own: personal data delivered electronically in response to an access request 
“shall be in a portable and… readily usable format.”75 In fact, the CCPA’s data 
portability “right” may be broader than the GDPR’s in some ways, as it applies 
to inferred data about an individual, where the GDPR’s right does not.76 
Both the CCPA and the GDPR contain a right for individuals to “opt out” 
and deny permission for handling of their personal data in certain ways. The 
CCPA establishes an opt-out right for consumers to tell a business not to sell 
their personal information.77 If a business has actual knowledge that a 
consumer is 16 years old or younger, it must obtain affirmative authorization 
(“opt-in”) for any sale of personal information.78 The GDPR, by comparison, 
establishes three analogous rights: the right to restrict data processing,79 the 
right to object to data processing,80 and the right to withdraw consent.81 
Although the GDPR has broader rights to opt out—they apply well beyond 
the sale of information—they are also less absolute than those in the CCPA.82 
Both regimes contain, too, a duty of nondiscrimination: companies cannot 
discriminate against individuals who choose to exercise the right to opt out.83 
This means that a business cannot, for example, deny goods or services, charge 
different rates, impose penalties, or provide a different level of services to 
customers who opt out of data transactions. 
The GDPR famously contains a right to erasure, also known as the “right 
to be forgotten.”84 The CCPA, too, creates a right to deletion.85 The GDPR’s 
right to erasure gives individuals the right to obtain the erasure of personal 
 
74 Id. at 4. 
75 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d). 
76 WP29 Portability Guideline, supra note 72, at 10; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o), (1), (k), 
(m). 
77 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120. Vermont’s new data broker law, H. 764, requires 
transparency as to whether a data broker allows consumers to opt out of collection or sale of 
information, but does not require a data broker to do so. See 9 V.S.A. ch. 62, subch. 5 (Vt.). 
78 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(d). That opt-in consent must come from a parent or 
guardian if the individual is under 13 years old, minors between 13 and 16 years old may 
provide their own opt-in consent. Id.  
79 GDPR, supra note 51,  art. 18.  
80 Id. art. 21, Recital 60, 70. 
81 Id. art. 7(3).  
82 Id. art. 2(1). There is also a balancing test specific to scientific or historical research 
purposes or statistical purposes. Id. art. 21(6). 
83 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125; GDPR, supra note 51,  Recital 42; Guidelines on 
Transparency under Regulation 2016/679, at 11, 2018 O.J. (WP260) (EC) (“giving as an 
example of “consent without detriment” that a company may “show that a service includes the 
possibility to withdraw without negative consequences, e.g. without the performance of the 
service being downgraded to the detriment of the user”). 
84 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU). See 
generally MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (2016). 
85 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 
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data both from companies with which they have a direct consumer 
relationship and from third parties, under certain circumstances.86 There are 
exceptions to the right to erasure, including freedom of expression and public 
interest in the area of public health.87 As many have noted, this so-called “right 
to be forgotten” is not absolute, but is in large part a balancing test between 
competing values, outsourced to private companies.88 The CCPA, by contrast, 
creates a narrower right to deletion. Unlike the GDPR’s right to erasure, which 
applies to third parties, the CCPA’s right to deletion applies only to businesses 
that collect information directly from the consumer.89 This more restricted 
scope may be a nod to First Amendment law and values in the United States, 
which may constrain erasure requirements imposed on third parties.90  
In sum, the CCPA moves closer to a data protection regime like the 
GDPR in certain ways, which help explain the assumption that it represents a 
U.S. embrace of the European-style data protection model. While the CCPA’s 
broad definition of personal data, emphasis on transparency, and 
establishment of some individual rights do go further than previous U.S. law, 
however, none of these shifts goes nearly as far as the GDPR—and as we shall 
see in the next section, all of them are overshadowed by important substantive 
differences between the two models. 
 
C. Substantive Differences  
 
Once an analysis moves beyond these basic similarities, however, it 
 
86 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 17(1)(a)–(f) (permitting an individual to exercise the right to 
erasure in circumstances including, but not limited to, when the personal data is no longer 
necessary for the purpose it was originally collected or processed for, the invididual withdraws 
their consent where the organization relied on said consent as the lawful basis of processing, 
or when the individual objects to the processing of their data for direct marketing purposes). 
87 Id. art. 17(3)(a), (c). 
88 See Case C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 317; Edward Lee, Recognizing 
Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017 
(2016); S. Kulk & F.Z. Borgesius, Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of  
Expression?, 5 EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REG. 3, 389–98 (2014). [Note: add IVIR research when 
complete.] 
89 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a). 
90 Sorrell v. IMS, 564 U.S. 552 (2011). See Anupam Chander, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
501, 522 (arguing that Sorrell demonstrates “the seriousness of First Amendment constraints 
on privacy regulations on information intermediaries”). Cases such as Florida Star v. BJF, 491 
U.S. 524 (1989), Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), and Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publishing, 443 U.S. 97 (1979) arguably suggest that once information is legally 
distributed, the government cannot restrict its use absent state interest of the highest order. 
However, a number of scholars argue that privacy laws can pass First Amendment muster. See, 
e.g.,  Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1501 (2015); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1183 (2016); but see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
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becomes clear that the CCPA regime differs sharply from the GDPR. First 
and perhaps most important, the two laws do not share the same underlying 
principles, leading to great differences in the scope and nature of the rights and 
duties imposed by each. Second, while the CCPA is broader than past 
American sectoral laws, it still regulates a much narrower set of entities than 
does the GDPR. Third, the two laws have different enforcement mechanisms. 
Fourth, their regulatory styles contrast with significant practical and 
substantive consequences. And finally, California and Europe are each quite 
distinct in what we call their legal setting—the backdrop against which privacy 
laws exist and will develop over time. We consider each of these differences in 
order. 
First and foremost, for all its moves toward broader coverage and the 
creation of individual rights, the CCPA does not treat privacy as a human right 
in the way data protection laws like the GDPR do. It remains, in the American 
tradition, a transactional privacy law concerned with protecting consumers in 
their dealings with commercial entities. For this reason, the CCPA does not 
embrace several principles that have been at the core of constitutionally 
influenced European data protection law since long before the GDPR—back 
to its predecessor, the 1995 Data Protection Directive,91 and back even further 
to national data protection laws in many European countries dating from the 
1970s and 1980s.92  
The GDPR is built around the concept of “lawful processing” of data. 
That is, personal data cannot be processed unless a data controller has 
obtained individual consent,93 or the processing falls under one of the other 
five enumerated categories of lawful processing.94 The CCPA does not require 
that processing be lawful. Rather, it shares the presumption of most other 
American privacy law that personal data may be collected, used, or disclosed 
unless a specific legal rule forbids these activities. This is likely the single most 
meaningful practical difference between the two regimes. 
Moreover, the GDPR imposes multiple additional conditions on all data 
processing, even when it is authorized by consent or another of the 
legitimizing conditions.95 The GDPR requires that personal data may be 
collected only for “specified, explicit and legitimate purposes,” stated at the 
time of collection.96 Additional principles include purpose limitation 
(processing data only for those previously stated purposes), data minimization 
(collecting no more data than necessary for those purposes), data retention 
 
91 Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EU). 
92 See, e.g. 1978 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz,  (Germany); Stat. no. 78-17 of 6 Jan. 1978 
(France); Data Protection Act 1984 (U.K.).  
93 Id. art. 6(1)(a). 
94 Id. art. 6(1)(a)-(f). 
95 Id. art. 5(1). 
96 Id. art. 5(1)(b). 
20 Catalyzing Privacy Law  
(limiting storage of data to periods justified by those purposes), privacy by 
design, as well as privacy impact assessments for high risk data processing, 
among others. 
The CCPA imposes few requirements concerning the purposes for data 
collection or the proportionality of data handling to those purposes. The 
CCPA does not even go as far as HIPAA, which requires that disclosures of 
patient data be the “minimum necessary” to achieve a purpose.97 Instead, the 
CCPA requires a business to provide notice if it is “using personal 
information collected for additional purposes.”98 This rule doesn’t stop 
companies from using data for new purposes—it just requires disclosure if 
they do so. As in many other places, the CCPA’s approach relies on 
transparency rather than following the GDPR by imposing substantive duties 
on companies that collect and process personal data.  
The divergence in their animating principles influences the two laws’ 
treatment of individual rights as well. The CCPA, apart from allowing 
individuals to opt out of sales of their personal data, affords individuals little 
control. It does nothing to enable individuals to refuse to give companies their 
data in the first place. The GDPR strives to do so by requiring stringent forms 
of consent in a number of circumstances99 and by granting individuals  robust 
rights throughout the life cycle of data processing, including: the right to 
rectification of incorrect information;100 the right to prevent automated 
individual decision-making and to receive explanation of any automated 
decision;101 and broader rights related to erasure of data and withdrawal of 
consent. Additionally, the GDPR’s requirement of lawful processing bestows 
more individual control than the CCPA.102 The CCPA relies primarily on 
transparency, and grants individuals only the two limited rights discussed 
above: to opt out of sale and to request deletion.  
Fundamentally, then, the CCPA is not a comprehensive European-style 
data protection regime. The GDPR quintessentially targets compliance from 
an organizational perspective: it attempts to build up a particular kind of 
responsible corporate infrastructure, including internal positions and 
 
97 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(b), 164.514(d). 
98 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b). 
99 And regarding both particularly sensitive data (special categories of data) and automated 
decision-making, the GDPR requires the more stringent “explicit consent,” if consent is to be 
the basis of processing. GDPR, supra note 51; Article 29 of the Data Protection Working 
Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-making and Profiling for the Purposes of 
Regulation, 17/EN. WP 251rev.01 (Oct. 3, 2017) (hereinafter “A29WP, Guidelines on 
Automated Individual Decision-making”). 
100 GDPR, supra note 51,  art. 16.. 
101 Id. art. 22. See also Margot E. Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERK. 
TECH. L. J. 189, 201 (2019).   
102 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 6(1)(a).  
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processes.103 Whether it will succeed is another question, but its aims are far 
broader, and approach far deeper, than the CCPA’s. The CCPA lacks the 
GDPR’s affirmative regulatory requirements—ranging from data 
minimization to risk assessments to recording requirements—imposed on 
companies even where there is not a corresponding individual right.104 Four 
other differences listed below further demonstrate that the CCPA is not the 
same sort of law as the GDPR.  
The second difference relates to regulated entities. As noted earlier, the 
GDPR covers anyone that processes personal data, including not only 
companies but also individuals, nonprofit organizations, and governments.105 
The CCPA applies only to businesses, and then only to those that meet a 
complex set of overlapping requirements related to their size or the extent of 
their involvement in personal data trade.106 Here again, the two laws reflect the 
dominant approach on each side of the Atlantic. A data protection model 
inherently aims to be comprehensive. The CCPA, while broader than many 
sectoral U.S. privacy laws of the past, still limits its aim to protecting 
consumers from certain data handling practices within a specific context 
defined by commerciality, geography, and scale.  
The regimes’ respective enforcement mechanisms are a third area of 
divergence. Both provide for monetary penalties for non-compliance. The 
GDPR authorizes administrative fines issued by national data protection 
regulators of up to 4% of a company’s annual worldwide revenue, while the 
CCPA includes civil penalties of up to $2,500 per violation or $7,500 per 
intentional violation, a number that can exact enormous sums when multiplied 
by the number of people affected in many privacy violations.107 However, 
there is no private right of action for affected individuals to enforce most 
elements of the CCPA. This is in keeping with the trend for U.S. privacy laws 
of at least the last twenty years, including the FTC Act, HIPAA and the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). There have been 
proposals in the California Legislature to add authorize private CCPA lawsuits, 
but for now only the state  Attorney General may enforce the most portions of 
 
103 Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic 
Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019). 
104 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 5(2). See also Kaminski, supra note 103. 
105 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 2(1).  
106 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.105, 1798.110, 1798.115, 1798.120, et seq. The CCPA 
targets three kinds of commercial entities as “businesses.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c). It 
targets larger businesses (with over twenty-five million dollars in annual gross revenue) that 
collect California residents’ personal data, regardless of how many people are impacted by this 
collection. It targets for-profit businesses of any size that buy, receive, sell, or share personal 
information concerning a significant number of residents (50,000 or more). And it targets 
businesses that derive half or more of their annual revenues from selling personal 
information—regardless of their size or how many people are affected by this activity. 
107 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 83; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(a), (b). 
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the law.108 Spurred by a constitutionally guaranteed right of redress for 
violations of individual rights, the GDPR does enable individual rights of 
action109 as well as enforcement by national data protection regulatory 
authorities and coordination of their efforts through a European Data 
Protection Board.110  
Fourth, the regulatory styles of the two regimes differ greatly. This can 
create both substantive and cultural gaps. While the CCPA creates limited but 
granular requirements, and tasks the state AG with providing more details, the 
GDPR largely regulates by issuing broad standards and then relying on various 
forms of guidance (the Recitals, European Data Protection Board Guidelines) 
and cooperation with companies to fill in the details.111 In other words, the 
GDPR’s approach to regulating largely constitutes collaborative governance, 
also known as “co-regulation” or “new governance.”112 The GDPR’s 
vagueness is arguably deliberate. It allows companies and sectors to fill in 
details of how to comply with the law over time, whether formally through 
establishing codes of conduct or certification mechanisms,113 or informally 
through self-regulation, recording and reporting, impact assessments, and 
ongoing conversations with regulators.114 By contrast, the CCPA’s granularity 
appears, in places, to value detail and certainty over flexibility.  
For example, where the GDPR simply states that it requires clarity and 
intelligibility in its access and notice rights, the statutory text of the CCPA 
specifies that companies provide a toll-free number and website address for 
access requests.115  For those businesses subject to the CCPA’s opt-out, the 
CCPA mandates a clear and conspicuous link titled “Do Not Sell My Personal 
Information,” and a description of the consumer’s right to opt out of sale of 
personal data. This example demonstrates a stylistic difference between the 
two laws that could have real consequences for businesses trying to comply 
with both. Often, the CCPA is so detailed that it creates the possibility of 
divergence between the laws, even where in broad strokes the two might 
appear similar. 
Finally, the two laws differ greatly in the backdrop against which they were 
each enacted, or what we call the legal setting. While the CCPA is constrained 
by increasingly deregulatory First Amendment doctrine, the GDPR is backed 
 
108 The CCPA does authorize private lawsuits for a narrow set of claims related to data 
security breaches.  
109 GDPR, supra note 51,  art. 77–79.  
110 Id. art. 51–59. 
111 See Kaminski, supra note 103; McGeveran, supra note 14.  
112 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
113 GDPR, supra note 51, art. 40, 42.  
114 See Kaminski, supra note 103; McGeveran, supra note 14. 
115 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130(a)(1). [Note: check status of amendment on this point] 
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by European courts that have increasingly recognized the importance of both 
privacy and data protection as fundamental rights.116 In recent years, these 
courts have applied the right to be forgotten to search engines;117 found the 
Data Retention Directive to violate fundamental rights;118 and invalidated the 
primary mechanism for transferring data to the United States because of fears 
that American national security surveillance would trample on Europeans’ 
rights.119  
Crucially, European constitutional structures enforce affirmative rights 
against private conduct, not just against state actors as in the U.S..120  And, 
while European constitutional traditions safeguard the right to freedom of 
expression, it is usually balanced against other rights, and it can and does often 
lose out to constitutional data protection rights.121 By contrast, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in recent years has interpreted free speech doctrine to restrict 
both data privacy regulations and other consumer protection disclosure 
regimes.122 Some observers worry that the First Amendment is becoming an 
increasingly blunt tool, subjecting many regulations concerning privacy and 
other topics to often-fatal strict scrutiny. Additionally, the Supreme Court has 
been skeptical of data privacy harms, in cases about both privacy damages and 
standing to sue.123 The U.S. Constitution contains no explicit data privacy 
right, and the Fourth Amendment protects only against state action, and not 
the actions of private parties. 
Thus, asserting that the CCPA is remotely equivalent to a data protection 
regime like the GDPR overstates the importance of a few resemblances. It is 
true that the CCPA departs from some common characteristics of previous 
U.S. privacy law and that it overlaps with some aspects of the GDPR. But the 
California law’s motivations, mechanisms, scope, and legal setting keep it well 
within the consumer protection tradition of American privacy law. The 
question now is which of these two fundamentally different laws is catalyzing 
the recent legislative activity around privacy in Congress and state legislatures. 
 
 
 
116 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 44. 
117 Case C–131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 317. 
118 Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. V. Minister for Communications, Marine 
and Natural Resources, 2014 E.C.R. 238. 
119 Case C–362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Curia, Court of Justice (Oct. 6, 
2015) (hereinafter “Schrems”). 
120 See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 44. 
121 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. at 68-149 (2008); Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First 
Amendment, 25 EUR. L. J. 140 (2019).   
122 See infra Part III.D.2. 
123 See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2004); FAA v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441 (2012); Clapper 
v. Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Frank 
v. Gaos, No. 17-961, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 2658 (Apr. 30, 2018).  
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III. CATALYZING PRIVACY  
 
The standard account of transatlantic privacy describes two 
fundamentally incompatible privacy regimes reflecting deep philosophical 
divides between legal cultures. According to this story, a laissez-faire approach 
to data privacy in the U.S. reflects broader liberal norms that prioritize 
individual autonomy in the face of big government, while the more 
interventionist EU approach reflects “social-protection norms” aimed at 
protecting human dignity.124 Researchers (including one of us) have argued this 
conventional wisdom oversimplifies matters by focusing on disparities in law-
on-the-books and ignoring similarities in practices-on-the-ground.125 
Nonetheless, the EU and U.S. have been unable, or at least disinclined, to 
come to an international consensus on data privacy, instead forging sui generis 
and unstable bilateral arrangements governing data transfers between the two 
regimes.126 
The CCPA and the GDPR herald a possible paradigm shift for data 
privacy. Rather than two fundamentally incompatible frameworks, one 
European and one American, we identify the emergence of a race between 
California and the European Union as regulatory catalysts, driving the U.S. 
states, and possibly the United States federal government, to enact new data 
privacy laws.127  
This Part first outlines the argument that the GDPR has been the 
dominant influence on both de facto and de jure spread of privacy law 
worldwide. We argue, however, that the United States represents an exception 
to this narrative—a narrative that largely and in our view mistakenly adheres to 
a notion of nation-states as unitary actors rather than considering the various 
players within them.128  
 
124 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1343 (1999); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity 
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
125  Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (2011); McGeveran, supra note 14, at 960. 
126  Schrems, supra note 119, at 93–94; [update with cite to Schrems II when decided] 
127  Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy Laws (1), 
BLOOMBERG LAW (last updated Feb. 6, 2019, 3:02 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-
push-for-consumer-privacy-laws-1. 
128 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 
INDIANA L.J. 1397, 1401–09 (1999) (contrasting five theories of how international human 
rights law is enforced: power, self-interest, liberal explanations, communitarian explanations, 
and legal process explanations—and noting the role of “transnational norm entrepreneurs” in 
legal process, in contrast to state-centric theories such as realism); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Liberal Theory of International Law, AM. SOC. OF INT’L LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL 
MEETING 240, 241 (2000) (describing liberal IR theory as “a view that preserves an important 
role for states but deprives them of their traditional opacity” in contrast to traditional IR 
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We then examine a number of recently proposed (and several recently 
enacted) state and federal data privacy laws, towards the goal of answering the 
question: which jurisdiction is driving this race to propose and enact new 
privacy rules? We find that although the commonly accepted narrative has 
credited new strong European rules as the driver,129 in practice U.S. states 
largely copied California. And although the CCPA does not necessarily provide 
the substantive content for recently proposed federal laws, it has been the 
impetus behind those congressional bills. California, not Europe, is catalyzing 
the development of U.S. data privacy law. 
The story of the CCPA and its imitators, we argue, is not the commonly 
assumed story about the unilateral power of Brussels. It demonstrates instead 
how networked individuals can harness processes at the state and local level to 
promote the adoption of new legal norms.130 Rather than causing a race to the 
bottom, the backdrop of data globalization both influences and empowers 
norm entrepreneurs advocating for stricter requirements. 
As to why other states are now copying the CCPA, we posit a number of 
reasons. First, California may have established itself nationally as an expert 
jurisdiction on data privacy law, through both the CCPA and earlier law—a 
sort of variant Delaware effect. Second, since so many companies have a 
significant presence in California, other states may be presuming a California-
driven “Brussels” effect: that is, that many companies already complying with 
the CCPA with respect to California residents would de facto comply with, or 
be readily able to comply with, CCPA-like requirements nationwide. Third, 
state legislators motivated to enact privacy protections are far more likely to 
model their laws on a roughly twenty-page law from a U.S. jurisdiction than a 
European law consisting of 99 Articles and 173 Recitals. This is not to say, 
however, that the GDPR has played no role. We note that Europe may be 
functioning as a quieter, but still significant, privacy catalyst. But this effect 
from the EU is more subtle than has been argued, and secondary to a very real 
California Effect. 
Finally, we close with some cautious predictions. We examine some of the 
countervailing forces unique to the United States that may contain the spread 
of privacy rules from one jurisdiction to the next, including the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the possibility of federal preemption, and the First 
Amendment. We hypothesize, however, that the spread of data privacy law in 
the United States will continue, with the CCPA as its floor. Whether it 
progresses state-by-state, spurs adoption of model state legislation, or results in 
a uniform federal law, a new data privacy equilibrium is fast being established 
in the United States. 
 
theory, “which conceive[s] of the international system as composed of unitary, identical state 
actors with fixed preferences (the billiard ball model”)). 
129 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra note 128. 
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A. Brussels as the World’s Privacy Catalyst 
 
As Paul Schwartz and others have observed, the GDPR is driving the 
enactment of new data privacy laws around the world.131 This matches what 
we described in Part I as a “California” Effect (de jure). The EU has strictly 
limited the export of personal data outside of the EU at least since the 1995 
Data Protection Directive came into effect, and this policy continued in the 
GDPR.132 The 1995 Directive envisioned that such crossborder transfers 
would be available only in one of three ways (and the same three were retained 
in the GDPR). Two of the methods are cumbersome, requiring individual 
companies to go through complex, inflexible, and often bureaucratic processes 
to adopt either “binding corporate rules” or “model contract clauses.”133  The 
third is the “adequacy mechanism,” which would operate on the national level 
instead of at the level of an individual organization. If the European 
Commission declares a foreign country’s data protection laws and enforcement 
to offer an “adequate level of protection,”134 then data can flow to any 
organization in that country with no further constraint. Because an adequacy 
ruling greatly simplifies data transfer in comparison to the more onerous 
options, many countries have sought to modify their laws to obtain such a 
ruling.135  
The adequacy process can thus be characterized as a deliberate legal export 
strategy. By making it much easier for companies doing business in the EU to 
transfer data across borders if their home jurisdictions regulate upwards, the 
EU deployed the Brussels Effect (de facto compliance) to cause a California 
Effect (de jure regulatory changes). As Schwartz cautions, the dynamic is more 
complicated in reality, because other jurisdictions have pushed back against the 
adequacy process, resulting in more of a give-and-take than pure export.136 But 
at the end of the day, the laws of other countries did look much more like EU 
law after these adequacy determinations than they did before. 
The GDPR also demonstrates a Brussels Effect, spurring many 
multinational companies to comply with its provisions worldwide, not only for 
operations dealing with European persons. When the GDPR went into effect 
in May 2018, people across the world, including Americans, begin receiving a 
fusillade of messages from companies updating their privacy policies. Some 
 
131 See generally Schwartz, supra note 7. 
132 See GDPR, supra note 51, art. 45; Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25.  
133 GDPR, supra note 51,  art. 46, 47 (describing binding corporate rules and standard 
contractual clauses, among other mechanisms); Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25 (outlining 
procedures for derogations from Article 25 limitations on crossborder transfers). 
134 Directive 95/46/EC, art. 25(1). 
135 See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 786–95(comparing UK, Japan, U.S. and noting that Israel, 
others have receive adequacy determinations). 
136 Id. at __. 
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companies have adopted the compliance infrastructure required in the 
GDPR—designating data protection officers, running impact assessments, 
baking in some form of privacy by design—throughout their international 
operations. Just as the scholarship on the Brussels Effect anticipates, these 
companies have found it desirable to maintain a unified firm-wide compliance 
architecture and adhered to the more stringent GDPR requirements. A few 
companies have gone even further by adopting aspects of the GDPR other 
than its compliance rules; Microsoft, for example, announced that it would 
“extend the rights that are at the heart of GDPR to all of our consumer 
customers worldwide.”137 
Not all companies have conformed their global operations to the GDPR, 
however. Some enterprises decided to avoid GDPR exposure by excluding 
Europeans entirely.138 For example, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago 
Tribune disabled access for internet users in the EU.139 National Public Radio 
took a different approach: “Users could either agree to the new terms, or 
decline and be taken to a plain-text version of the site, looking for all the world 
like it had last been updated in 1996.”140 Chinese smart-home manufacturer 
Yeelight disabled internet-connected lightbulbs in the European Union.141 For 
these firms, even the potential benefits of serving the huge European market 
could not justify the costs of compliance, or the risks of non-compliance.  
 
B. But See United States 
 
While the GDPR’s adequacy mechanism and its direct effect on global 
companies may be enticing other jurisdictions worldwide to enact data privacy 
law, it is not the catalyst for recently proposed laws in the United States. 
Indeed, as Part II shows, the CCPA is not modeled on the GDPR, though 
both certainly have shared similarities founded in the long-established Fair 
Information Practice Principles. The forces behind both the CCPA and its 
counterparts across the United States do not seek a strong adequacy ruling 
from the European Union. Nearly a quarter century of European data 
 
137 Julie Brill, Microsoft’s commitment to GDPR, privacy and putting customers in control of their own 
data, MICROSOFT BLOG (May 21, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
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139 Alex Hern & Jim Waterson, Sites Block Users, Shutdown Activities and Flood Inboxes as 
GDPR Rules Loom, THE GUARDIAN (May 24, 2018), 
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effect (noting that U.S. papers such as the New York Daily News, the Baltimore Sun, Orlando 
Sentinel, and the San Diego Union-Tribune also disabled access). 
140 Id. 
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protection law did not prompt the United States to take up a broad law of its 
own.  
Why has the United States gone its own way? We will note later that the 
exceptional American approach to free expression, and its tension with some 
portions of the GDPR framework, may be an inhibiting factor. But we believe 
that another moment of norm entrepreneurship was equally critical. The EU 
prohibition on crossborder data transfers became effective in 1998 under the 
Data Protection Directive. Faced with the near certainty that United States law 
would not be found adequate for unrestricted data flow from the European 
Union,142 the Clinton Administration set out to negotiate an exception because 
U.S. companies wanted to avoid using the more cumbersome mechanisms for 
data transfer available under the European law. Bolstered by its close 
relationship to Europe as well as America’s economic and other soft power, 
the Clinton Administration worked out a bespoke exemption from the 
European rules. American and European diplomats worked for years to 
negotiate a separate data trade agreement applicable only to their bilateral 
relationship.  
The resulting “U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement,” signed in 2000 between 
the Clinton Administration and the European Commission, allowed U.S. 
companies to certify annually that they adhered to a set of rather vague data 
protection principles in order to transfer personal data from the EU.143 The 
U.S. thus inoculated itself against any catalyzing effect from EU data 
protection law, of either the de facto or de jure variety. The European 
Commission (effectively the EU’s executive branch) ratified the Safe Harbor as 
consistent with EU data protection law.144 In 2015, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, citing the revelations of Edward Snowden, struck down the 
Safe Harbor.145 Even then, the response was not for the U.S. to conform its 
law to the EU adequacy standard, or even to concede that American data 
controllers would need to use one of  the other mechanism for crossborder 
data transfers. Instead, the two sides returned to the negotiating table and 
 
142 An adequacy determination would not have been forthcoming from the EU without 
dramatic legal and regulatory changes in the U.S. See Article 29 Working Party, WP 15, Op. 
1/99, Concerning the Level of Data Protection in The United States and the Ongoing Discussions Between 
the European Commission and the United States Government 2 (1999) (“[T]he current patchwork of 
narrowly-focused sectoral laws and voluntary selfregulation cannot at present be relied upon to 
provide adequate protection in all cases for personal data transferred from the European 
Union.”); but see Christopher Wolf, Delusions of Adequacy? Examining the Case for Finding the United 
States Adequate for Cross-Border EU-U.S. Data Transfers, 43 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 227 (2014) 
(making an admittedly contrarian argument that U.S. law could be judged adequate under the 
Data Protection Directive). 
143 See Intl. Trade Admin, Welcome to the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Agreement (Jan, 12, 2017), 
https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp. 
144 See Commission Decision 2000/520, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7.  
145 Schrems v. Commissioner, Case C-362/14 (CJEU 2015). 
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reached a new compromise, known as the “EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.”146 This 
arrangement is now being challenged in EU courts as well.147 But the adequacy 
provision that spurred countries from Argentina to Thailand to change their 
law failed to move U.S. privacy law.148 
The GDPR’s rules on crossborder transfer are the same as their 
forerunners in the Directive. And the Privacy Shield continues to apply to 
crossborder trnasfers of personal data under the new regime. Thus, the 
adequacy mechanism seems unlikely to have catalyzed legislative activity in the 
U.S. the way it has in the rest of the world. We now turn to examine the that 
extensive state and federal legislative activity in the United StatesOur close 
comparison of the GPDA and the CCPA in Part I and our examination below 
of various state and federal privacy bills shows that the CCPA, not the GDPR, 
played the leading role in the legislative response across the United States. The 
various state bills are often modeled on provisions of the CCPA. Federal bills 
in turn are the political response to state legislative activity prompted by the 
CCPA. 
 
1. State laws 
 
Over the last year, the United States has seen an unprecedented volume of 
legislative proposals regulating data privacy at the state level. This burst of 
interest has manifested in multiple types of laws: on data security, on internet 
service provider (ISP) privacy, on specific types of data, and on comprehensive 
data privacy. Our focus here is on comprehensive data privacy, but we start 
with a short overview of legislative activity in the broader space, to give a 
better sense of just how active state legislators have been. 
Legislatures in nearly half of the states (twenty-one at our count) 
considered  or enacted data security bills in 2018–2019.149 Data privacy and 
 
146 See Intl. Trade Admin, Privacy Shield Overview, 
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(4)(a) and 3074, relative to the Database Security Breach Notification Law, LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
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data security are not identical policy discussions.150 Yet the rush to enact data 
security law shows the growing appetite for these issues, which are often 
conflated by legislators—evidenced by Colorado’s “data privacy” law, which is 
largely focused not on privacy but on data security. According to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) in 2019 alone, consumer privacy bills 
were introduced or filed in at least 25 states and Puerto Rico.151 At least ten 
states considered privacy laws aimed at internet service providers (ISPs), 
presumably in response to Congress’s 2017 repeal of the Federal 
Communications Commission’s Broadband Privacy rules.152 And legislators in 
many states proposed narrower privacy laws, on topics from protection of 
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happens-next/. See H.B. 230, H.B. 232, 30th Leg. Sess., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2017), H.B. 277, S.B. 
160, 30th Leg. Sess., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2018) (all 4 bills died); H.R. No. 80-18, 29th Leg. Sess., 
2018 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018) (introduces a task force on ISP privacy); S.B. 243, 2019 Reg. Sess. 
(Ky. 2019); S.P. 275, 2019 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 216 (West); H.B. 1655, 438th Gen. Assemb. 
(Md. 2018), H.B. 141, 439th Gen Assemb. (Md. 2019); H.B. 382, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2019); 
H.B. 1030, 91st Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2019), S.B. 433, S.B. 1553, 90th Leg. Sess., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2018); H.B. 457, 66th Leg. Sess., 2019 Sess. (Mont. 2019) (failed in 
committee); S.B. 2641, A.B. 3711, A.B. 1927, A.B. 1527, 218th Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2018); S.B. 
5245, 242nd Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 246, 203rd Gen Assemb. (Pa. 2019). 
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biometric information or geolocation information to student privacy.153  
In addition to these individual state proposals, the Uniform Law 
Commission (ULC) recently voted to begin work on a uniform law that would 
establish “a comprehensive legal framework for the treatment of data privacy,” 
guided to a large degree by the scope of the CCPA.154 The ULC has drafted 
and promoted hundreds of model statutes, from the Uniform Commercial 
Code to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Once the ULC votes to publish 
model bills, it is up to individual state legislatures to adopt them. One of the 
authors of this Article, William McGeveran, will serve as the reporter for the 
committee drafting this legislation. Our focus here is on the unprecedented 
flurry of comprehensive data privacy legislation. Restricting the focus to 
comprehensive data privacy laws, we count at least 17 states, in addition to 
California and Puerto Rico, that considered or enacted comprehensive data 
privacy laws in 2018 and 2019.155 Five states established task forces with the 
goal of proposing data privacy legislation.156 Including task forces, there are at 
least 19 states (and Puerto Rico) considering or enacting comprehensive data 
privacy legislation.157 
We focus here on a few of these proposals to identify their intellectual 
origins in either the CCPA or the GDPR. We find that, despite popular claims 
to the contrary, the regulatory contagion around data privacy in the United 
States is emanating not from Brussels, but from California. 
Take, for example, Connecticut’s proposed comprehensive data privacy 
bill, SB 1108. The original version of the bill, introduced in January 2019, 
effectively copied the CCPA, with minor edits. The definition of “personal 
information” was identical; the definition of a covered “business” was 
 
153 See, e.g., H.F. 2534, Iowa Online Services and Mobile Apps for Students (2018); Illinois 
H.B. 2785, Geolocation Privacy Protection Act (2019); New Hampshire H.B. 536 (2019) 
(biometric information); Oregon H.B. 2866 (2019) (geolocation info); Tennessee H.B. 0352 
(2019) (making unauthorized use or distribution of personal health information a violation of 
consumer protection law); Vermont S.B. 110 (2019) (student privacy law); Virginia H.B. 2535 
(requiring sites to let minors request to remove information). 
154 Katie Robinson, Uniform Law Comm’n, Press Release, New Drafting and Study Committees 
to Be Appointed (Jul. 24, 2019), available at 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/newsandpublications/news.   
155 See Hawaii SB 418 (2019); Illinois HB 3358 (2019); Louisiana HB 465 (2019); Maine LD 
946 (2019); Maryland HB 901 (2019); Massachusetts S.120 (2019); Minnesota HF 2917 (2019); 
Missouri HB 1253 (2019); Nevada SB 220 (2019, codified at Chap. 211); New Jersey A4640 
(2019); New Jersey A4902 (2019); New Mexico SB 176 (2019); New York A7736 (2019); New 
York S5642 (2019); Pennsylvania HB 1049 (2019); Rhode Island HB 5930 (2019); Texas HB 
4518 (2019); Vermont H. 764 (2018); Washington SB 5376 (2019). 
156 Connecticut SB 1108; Hawaii HCR 225; Louisiana HR 249; North Dakota HB 1485; 
Texas (council) HB 4390 (establishing the Texas Privacy Protection Advisory Council). 
157 North Dakota and Connecticut are each counted once in our analysis, as both states 
proposed comprehensive data privacy legislation and ultimately instead established a task 
force. 
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identical.158 Like the CCPA, the proposed Connecticut bill granted individuals 
access rights,159 a right to deletion,160 and a right to opt out of the sale of one’s 
data.161 Like the CCPA, the proposed Connecticut bill prohibited business 
from discriminating against consumers for exercising their rights.162 The 
proposed bill so closely tracked the CCPA’s requirements that it, too, required 
a toll-free number for requesting access, and a conspicuous “Do Not Sell My 
Personal Information” link for opting out of sale.163 Ultimately, however, 
legislators replaced the bill with a substitute act establishing a task force 
concerning consumer privacy, signed into law on July 9, 2019.164 The Act 
instructs the task force to “examine what information businesses in this state 
should be required to disclose to consumers …[s]uch examination shall 
include, but not be limited to, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, as 
amended, to consider what provisions could be implemented in this state.”165 
Massachusetts’ proposed data privacy bill, SD 341, also introduced in 
January 2019, provides another clear example of this mimicry.166 In multiple 
places, SD 341 contains language identical to the California law. Like the 
CCPA, the proposed Massachusetts bill applies to “businesses,” and like the 
CCPA, this includes both businesses with gross revenues over a certain 
threshold (ten million dollars in Massachusetts, twenty-five million dollars in 
California) and businesses that derive fifty percent or more of annual revenue 
from the disclosure of personal information. SD 341’s exception for publicly 
available information, too, almost perfectly adopts CCPA language.167 While 
SD 341 does not contain the CCPA’s exhaustive list of examples of personal 
information, its core definition of personal information differs by just one 
word.168  The proposed Massachusetts bill would put in place notice, access, 
 
158 Compare CCPA 1798.140(c) (defining “business”) & 1798.140(o) (defining “personal 
information” with SB 1108 §1(3) (defining “business”) & §1(15) (defining “personal 
information”). 
159 SB 1108 §§2, 4, 6. 
160 SB 1108 §3 
161 SB 1108 §7. 
162 SB 1108 §8. 
163 SB 1108 §9(1), §10(1). 
164 See generally 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/cgabillstatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&which_year=201
9&bill_num=Sb+1108. 
165 SB 1108 §1(a). 
166 Mark D. Quist, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation Introduced In Massachusetts – Includes 
Private Right Of Action Without A Need To Prove Harm, MONDAQ (Feb. 15, 2019), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/781198/Data+Protection+Privacy/Comprehensive
+Data+Privacy+Legislation+Introduced+In+Massachusetts+Includes+Private+Right+Of+
Action+Without+A+Need+To+Prove+Harm. 
167 Compare California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.198(K)(2) (2018), with SD 341, Mass. Acts § 6 (2019). 
168 SD 341, Mass. Acts § 6 (2019) (““information that identifies, relates to, describes, is 
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a 
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and deletion requirements that largely correspond to CCPA requirements.169 
Like the CCPA, the rights are not waivable.170 
In some places, the proposed Massachusetts bill is stronger than the 
CCPA. It gives consumers the right to opt out not just of sale of personal 
information, but of third party disclosure.171 And unlike the CCPA, it provides 
for a private right of action, with statutory damages of $750 per consumer per 
incident, plus attorney fees.172 Mirroring the CCPA, it directs the state attorney 
general to write regulations and empowers that office to enforce the new 
privacy rules. 173 
Also in January 2019, North Dakota introduced data privacy legislation174 
that was similar to the CCPA in a number of ways. Despite its origin story–
one of the drafters watched a news report on European privacy law175–the 
North Dakota bill’s roots, did not lie in the GDPR either. The North Dakota 
bill defined a covered business nearly word-for-word identically to the CCPA’s 
definition.176 The definition of “personal information,” too, closely tracked 
that in the CCPA.177 It created a right of access similar to the CCPA’s. Unlike 
the CCPA, however, the North Dakota bill would have prohibited disclosure 
of personal information without express written consent. It also differed from 
 
particular consumer or the consumer’s device” in MA; “information that identifies, relates to, 
describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or 
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household” in CA.”). 
169 Id. at § 2(10) (Notice At or Before Collection: requiring disclosure of categories of 
personal info, business purpose, consumer rights, and more); id. at § 3(11) (Verifiable 
Consumer Requests: right to request specific pieces of personal info, names of third parties to 
whom disclosed, sources, business purpose); id. at § 5(14) (Right to Delete: covering right to 
delete info collected from the consumer); id. at § 6(15) (Right to Opt Out of Third-party 
disclosure instead of sale!). 
170 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192, with SD 341, Mass. Acts § 14(23) (2019). 
171 SD 341, Mass. Acts § 6(15) (2019). 
172 Id. at § 9(19). 
173 Id. at § 10, § 11. 
174 H.B. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019). 
175 Sara Merken, States Follow EU, California in Push for Consumer Privacy Laws (1), 
BLOOMBERG LAW (last updated Feb. 6, 2019, 3:02 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/states-follow-eu-california-in-
push-for-consumer-privacy-laws-1 (“North Dakota Rep. Jim Kasper (R) told Bloomberg Law 
that he decided to introduce legislation after watching a ‘60 Minutes’ program about the new 
rights the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation provides to EU citizens.”). 
176 Compare H.B. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019), with California Consumer Privacy 
Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198 (2018). 
177 Compare H.B. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019) (“’Personal information’ means 
information that identifies, describes, or could reasonably linked with a particular individual. 
The term does not include publicly available information lawfully made available to the general 
public from federal, state, or local government records…”), with California Consumer Privacy 
Act of 2018 (“CCPA”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.198(o)(1) (2018) (“’Personal information’ 
means information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or 
could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household…”). 
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the CCPA because it lacked a notice requirement, or a right to deletion. Also 
unlike the CCPA, the North Dakota bill would have created a private right of 
action.178 In February 2019, the bill was replaced by a proposal for a legislative 
study of data privacy laws.179 
The above three states are just a sampling of this dynamic. We find at least 
eight other states with proposals that could similarly be characterized to 
various degrees as CCPA mimics.180 Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island, like Connecticut and Massachusetts, copied portions of the CCPA 
wholesale in their proposed data privacy bills.181 One proposed Texas bill, too, 
largely tracked the CCPA.182 Texas ultimately enacted another bill into law, the 
Texas Privacy Protection Act; while initially a broad data protection law, it was 
ultimately amended to create a council to report back on proposed statutory 
changes by September 2020.183 Illinois, too, appears to have imitated the text 
of the CCPA in its proposed Data Transparency and Privacy Act, which would 
apply the CCPA definition of “businesses,” and would grant consumers both 
notice and access rights, and a right to opt out of sale, although it carved out 
the use of data for advertising and other exemptions.184 Maryland’s bill and 
Hawaii’s original bill (later replaced with a task force) offer a similar set of 
rights to the CCPA, though they differ in some significant aspects.185 
Nevada is one of the only states to not just propose but actually enact new 
data privacy law in this period. Nevada amended its existing privacy law in May 
2019, and it will go into effect in October 2019.186 Existing Nevada law already 
required websites and online services which collect certain personal 
information to provide notice to consumers.187 While not directly importing 
language from the CCPA, the new Nevada law echoes the conceptual core of 
the CCPA by prohibiting companies from selling consumer information on 
 
178 H.B. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. § 51-37-05 (N.D. 2019) (“If an individual’s personal 
information is purchased, received, sold, or shared by a covered entity in violation of this 
chapter, the individual may bring a civil action in a court of this state…”). 
179 H.B. 1485, 66th Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2019).  
180 See also https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy--security-law-blog/2019/02/copycat-
ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-across-cou 
181 Mississippi HB 2153; Pennsylvania H.B. 1049 (April 2019); Rhode Island H.B. 5930 
(March 2019). 
182 Texas H.B. 4518. By contrast, Texas H.B. 4390 takes more of a blended CCPA-GDPR 
approach. https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/html/HB04390I.htm 
183 https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/state-and-federal-privacy-legislation-63216/ 
184 Illinois HB 3358 
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId=108&GA=101&DocTy
peId=HB&DocNum=3358&GAID=15&LegID=119864&SpecSess=&Session= 
185 Hawaii S.B. 418, Maryland S.B. 0613. See also https://www.dwt.com/blogs/privacy--
security-law-blog/2019/02/copycat-ccpa-bills-introduced-in-states-across-cou 
186 https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/6365/Overview. 
187 NRS 603A.340. 
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receipt of a “verified request” from the consumer to opt out.188 The scope of 
the Nevada law is far narrower than the CCPA: it covers a narrower definition 
of personal information, and a narrower subset of businesses, and requires less 
of them (no access requests, no deletion). It also defines “Sale” less broadly 
than does the CCPA. But its focus on an opt-out for restricting sale of 
personal data is distinctly Californian, and not European. 
In summary: a considerable number of states are mimicking the precise 
technical language of the CCPA language, while others are adopting its core 
framework of individual rights. No state has proposed adopting European-
style comprehensive data protection law. The only two proposed state laws we 
found that focused not just on individual rights but also on more GDPR-like 
compliance obligations are Washington’s recently failed Privacy Act189 and one 
of the two bills proposed in Texas.190 Both ultimately were not enacted, at least 
not in that form. We discuss the Washington example at further length below. 
Finally, one of New York’s latest proposals reflects a third competing concept 
of data privacy, which we introduce and discuss in the next section.191 But our 
close analysis clearly shows that California, not Europe, is catalyzing 
comprehensive data privacy legislation in states around the country. 
 
2. Federal Laws 
 
If the state bills are typically modeled on the CCPA, proposed federal 
privacy bills may not look much like the CCPA at all. Yet, we argue, they are 
clearly drafted in response to it. There were by our count at least ten federal 
data privacy proposals introduced in 2018 and 2019.192 Additionally, a 
bipartisan group of six Senators has been working on draft legislation that has 
been widely understood to be the most serious of the proposals, although talks 
may recently have slowed down.193 We here compare several of these proposed 
 
188 S.B. 220 (Nev., codified at NRS 603A).  
189 Washington Privacy Act, H.B. 5376, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); see also H.B. 5919, Reg. 
Sess. (proposed Wash. 2019). 
190 https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/html/HB04390I.htm 
191 New York SB 5642, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s5642; Issie 
Lapowsky, New York’s Privacy Bill Is Even Bolder than California’s, WIRED (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-privacy-act-bolder/. 
192 See supra note 4 (listing comprehensive privacy bills currently being considered in 
Congress). See generally Cameron F. Kerry, Breaking Down Proposals for Privacy Legislation: How Do 
They Regulate?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breaking-
down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-regulate/; Tim Peterson, Circling Closer to 
a Federal Privacy Law, Congress Has Introduced 7 Privacy Bills This Year, DIGIDAY (June 25, 2019), 
https://digiday.com/marketing/cheatsheet-know-7-privacy-bills-congress-introduced-year/. 
193 Gopal Ratnam, Progress on Federal Data Privacy Bill Slows in Both Chambers, ROLL CALL 
(June 25, 2019), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/progress-on-federal-data-privacy-
bill-slows-in-both-chambers; Harper Neidig, Senators Ramp Up Privacy Bill Work, THE HILL 
(May 1, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/441667-senators-ramp-up-privacy-bill-
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federal laws to show how they differ from both the GDPR and the CCPA—
and note how, in fact, a third model has emerged. We close this section by 
explaining why, nonetheless, the CCPA can be understood as the primary 
catalyst of federal data privacy proposals. 
We compare below the following proposed legislation to the CCPA and 
GDPR: Senator Ron Wyden’s Consumer Data Protection Act, Senator Marco 
Rubio’s American Data Dissemination Act, and Senator Brian Schatz’s Data 
Care Act. We conclude that the substantive provisions of several of the bills 
draw from older privacy law or from academic proposals, not the GDPR or 
the CCPA. Only Senator Wyden’s bill shows direct signs of influence from 
both the CCPA and GDPR. 
The proposed Consumer Data Privacy Act (“CDPA”), introduced by 
Senator Wyden in November 2018, incorporates language and concepts from 
both the CCPA and GDPR, yet differs from both. For example, like the 
CCPA, the CDPA’s definition of personal information focuses on whether 
information is “reasonably linkable” to an individual.194 Like the CCPA, the 
CDPA does not cover businesses below a certain size, as long as they meet 
other restrictions.195 The CDPA, however, would incorporate a number of 
aspects of the GDPR: it would require reporting in some circumstances; create 
access rights,196 including with respect to companies that lack a direct 
relationship with consumers;197 create a right of correction; and require impact 
assessments for automated decision-making. Unlike either the GDPR or 
CCPA, however, the CDPA would build enforcement around a robust 
consumer right to opt out of data sharing with third parties. The CDPA directs 
the FTC to promulgate regulations, and houses enforcement with the FTC, to 
 
work; Talks of Federal US Privacy Law Slowing Down on Capitol Hill, IAPP (June 11, 2019), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/talks-of-federal-u-s-privacy-law-slowing-down-on-capitol-hill/. 
194 Consumer Data Privacy Act (“CDPA”), SIL18b29, 115th Cong. (2019) (“[A]ny 
information, regardless of how the information is collected, inferred, or obtained that is 
reasonably linkable to a specific consumer or consumer device” versus CCPA: “information 
that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”).  
195 Compare SIL18b29, 115th Cong. § 5 (2019) (CDPA excludes companies with less than 
fifty million dollars in average annual gross receipts; it also requires that they not collect 
information on over one million people and devices and are not data brokers), with CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.140(1)(A) (2018) (CCPA excludes companies with less than twenty-five million 
dollars in annual gross revenues). 
196 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.130 (2018) (Businesses required to “identify the consumer, 
associate the information provided by the consumer in the verifiable request to any personal 
information previously collected by the business about the consumer” and provides for 
correction or challenge rights for inaccurate information). 
197 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110 (2018) (“A consumer shall have the right to request that 
a business that collects personal information about the consumer disclose to the 
consumer…[t]he categories of third parties with whom the business shares personal 
information.”); Art. 14 GDPR – Information to be provided where personal data have not 
been obtained from the data subject at 31 (2016), https://gdpr-info.eu/art-33-gdpr/. 
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which it allocates considerable additional resources. It does not preempt state 
regulation. 
The proposed Data Care Act (“DCA”), introduced in December 2018 by 
Senator Schatz with fourteen cosponsors, differs fundamentally from both the 
CCPA and GDPR. The DCA focuses on duties owed by companies with a 
direct relationship to consumers, not on data brokers or other third parties. 
The DCA would impose duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality on online 
service providers. Thus, the DCA advances a consumer protection rather than 
data protection model of privacy, and does not impose any of the particular 
transparency requirements that are central to both the California and EU 
regimes. 
In this way, the DCA embodies an emerging strain of thought about 
privacy among US scholars who advocate redefining privacy as a matter of 
“trust” or “fiduciary-like duty” on the part of large-scale data collectors.198 The 
“information fiduciary” model of data privacy has not been limited to Senator 
Schatz’s federal proposal; the recent New York Privacy Act, too, was modeled 
on the concept.199 This shows the possibility of a third potential catalyst on the 
field—the concept of an “information fiduciary,” stemming from a number of 
academic proposals— and indicates perhaps an upcoming battle of the norm 
entrepreneurs, discussed further below. 
Schatz’s bill puts enforcement in the hands of the FTC, already responsible 
for enforcing aspects of U.S. data privacy under its consumer protection 
authority. The DCA would not preempt state privacy laws, although state AGs 
would be prevented from bringing enforcement actions during an FTC 
enforcement action.200 
The proposed American Data Dissemination Act (“ADD”), introduced by 
Senator Rubio in January 2019, directs the FTC to propose privacy rules 
“substantially similar, to the extent practicable, to the requirements applicable 
to agencies” under the 1974 Privacy Act.201 Unlike the Privacy Act, which 
applies only to the federal government, these rules would apply to private 
sector actors that collect certain types of personal information. 
 
198 See ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN 
INFORMATION AGE (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U. 
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the 
GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE L. REV. 1057 (2019); Neil Richards & Woodrow 
Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap, 126 YALE L. J. 1180 (2017); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, 
Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016); Tim Wu, Opinion, An 
American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr.html.  
199 Emily Bruemmer, State and Federal Privacy Legislation Stalls, JD SUPRA (June 28, 2019), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/state-and-federal-privacy-legislation-63216/; New York 
SB 5642, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s5642; Lapowsky, supra note 191. 
200 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. §5 (2018). 
201 American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 115th Cong. (2019) 
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The ADD resembles the GDPR and CCPA only to the extent that those 
two regimes, like the Privacy Act, build on Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs). It directs the FTC to adopt regulations that restrict disclosures of 
records; create an access right; and create a correction right of sorts, or at least 
a means to amend and dispute inaccurate records based on process established 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Thus the ADD draws on neither 
the CCPA nor the GDPR directly, but instead uses existing federal privacy law 
as its model. The ADD would preempt state privacy laws. 
While the three bills do not mimic the CCPA to the extent state laws do, 
the CCPA laid the groundwork for federal legislation in two key ways. First, 
because U.S. corporations with national reach will likely find themselves 
having to comply with the CCPA (and possibly also the GDPR), a federal rule 
presents less of a regulatory burden for U.S. corporations than it would have 
in the absence of the CCPA. Second, many also hope to limit the regulatory 
burden of multiple, varying state laws by enacting a federal law that preempts 
state laws. Given the flurry of activity in state houses across the country, a 
federal law seems to many businesses like the least worst option. In this sense 
the federal response may well be a backlash against the CCPA rather than an 
embrace of it. To extend the metaphor of regulatory contagion: federal 
proposals can be characterized as an immunity response mobilizing in 
Congress, attempting to inoculate national companies against the CCPA and 
its imitators.  
 
C. California as U.S. Privacy Catalyst 
 
The above analysis—in Part II comparing the CCPA and GDPR, and in 
this Part above analyzing in detail a number of recent state and federal 
proposals—leads us to a new understanding of what is happening in the race 
to influence U.S. data privacy law. California, not Europe, has been catalyzing 
the rapid proposal of privacy laws both across states and at the federal level. 
What has been happening is more complex, and more interesting, than the 
conventional narrative of a long-armed, unilateral Brussels. 
In this section, we offer an alternative story. We begin with a discussion of 
how our departure from the GDPR-centric narrative is more than just a shift 
in location from Brussels to Sacramento. The story of California as the U.S. 
data privacy catalyst involves not just state government actors, but tightly 
networked norm entrepreneurs, acting against backdrop forces of data 
globalization. The spread of the CCPA to other states, we posit, reflects a 
number of overlapping dynamics, and the influence of the GDPR is only one 
of them. This version of the story may be messier than a pure Brussels Effect, 
but it is far more accurate, and leads to several insights about the near future 
of U.S. data privacy law. 
The theories of regulatory catalysis that we discussed in Part I are 
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essentially realist or rational choice theories of lawmaking. That is, the Brussels 
Effect largely conceives of States (and states) as unitary actors, using power to 
achieve compliance on an international stage, or balancing sticks with carrots 
to drive both state and non-state actors towards rationally choosing a 
regulatory goal. The story of the CCPA, when examined in greater detail, is far 
more complex. It is not the story of California as a unified state actor, but of a 
collection of individual norm entrepreneurs that functionally hijacked the state 
legislative process to produce the law. In this sense, it is a legal process story 
made up not just of governments but of individuals, issue networks, and 
interpretative communities, one that reflects Harold Koh’s characterization of 
vertical legal process in style if not in transnational nature. 202 
If the origin story of the CCPA teaches anything, it is that individuals and 
networks of individuals play significant roles in the process of regulatory 
catalysis. Before 2018, California, like every other U.S. state and the federal 
government, had no comprehensive data privacy law. Real estate developer 
Alastair Mactaggart wanted to enact such law in California. Mactaggart and his 
friend Rick Arney, who had worked in the California legislature, knew they 
could use California’s referendum process to avoid being tangled up by 
lobbying in the legislature. Mactaggart befriended Mary Stone Ross, who had 
worked for the CIA and the House Intelligence Committee. They collaborated 
on drafting the ballot initiative through a group they named the Californians 
for Consumer Privacy, the political committee that then pushed the bill 
(although later Ross and Mactaggart had a falling out).203 Mactaggart looked up 
privacy experts, and contacted UC Berkeley Professor Chris Jay Hoofnagle, 
who put him in touch with former FTC Chief Technologist Ashkan Soltani. 
Mactaggart then hired Soltani to help revise the proposed ballot initiative, the 
bones of which became the CCPA.204 Then, as Soltani has put it, 
“Mactaggart… offered Silicon Valley a take-it-or-leave-it privacy policy—the 
same kind that Silicon Valley usually offered everyone else.”205 
By using the California ballot initiative process, Mactaggart and his allies 
forced the state legislature’s hand.206 The California legislature, fearing the 
practical difficulties of a ballot initiative that would become nearly 
 
202 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. 
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unchangeable law with immediate effect,207 scrambled to draft a bill that would 
persuade the initiative’s sponsors to withdraw it.208 State Assemblymember Ed 
Chau and State Senator Robert Hertzberg, both from districts neighboring Los 
Angeles, introduced the bill. The enactment of the CCPA does not represent 
the action of a legislature that independently recognized a social problem it 
could help address, but the legislature’s reaction to leverage exerted by highly 
motivated, connected—and, at least in Mactaggart’s case, wealthy—
individuals.209 
Rather than causing a race to the bottom, the backdrop of data 
globalization appears to have both influenced and empowered these norm 
entrepreneurs. First, news stories about the effects of data globalization 
enabled Mactaggart to frame the importance of the initiative, as he repeatedly 
pointed to the story of the British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica using 
U.S. persons’ data to manipulate voters in the 2016 election. Indeed, that 
scandal was cited by the legislature itself as a motivating factor for the CCPA 
in its preamble.210 Second, data globalization may have lowered some of the 
bigger hurdles to privacy lawmaking in California (and possibly Congress) by 
imposing GDPR compliance costs on the large Silicon Valley enterprises, 
which almost all have a European presence. Faced with significant privacy 
compliance costs from the GDPR, the marginal cost of a state privacy statute 
to their business model was now much lower. Third, data globalization 
enabled the GDPR itself to touch U.S. citizens in the form of both updated 
privacy policies and news stories about protective European privacy law. This 
may have made the CCPA more palatable, or at least caused U.S. citizens to 
wonder why Europeans should get privacy protections that they do not.   
What happened next—the spread of the CCPA—was intended and 
predicted by its originators, who hypothesized that, like California emissions 
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standards, a baseline data privacy law would spread.211 We offer four 
explanations, beyond the usual dynamics of the California Effect, as to why 
this is happening.  
First, even prior to the CCPA, California established itself nationally as an 
expert jurisdiction on data privacy law, given both previous pioneering 
legislation and the presence of Silicon Valley within its borders. California has 
been a forerunner in laws governing online data privacy and data security for 
over fifteen years. The California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) 
was enacted in 2003 and went into effect in 2004.212 It was the first U.S. law to 
require companies to post a privacy policy.213 In the intervening years, privacy 
policies have become ubiquitous across the internet.  
Also in 2003, California enacted legal rules requiring companies that have 
suffered a qualifying data security breach to notify users whose information 
may have been compromised.214 Prior to California’s intervention, few 
companies voluntarily disclosed security breaches of their customers’ personal 
information, fearing the public relations disaster of such a revelation. At first, 
some companies limited their compliance with the data breach notification law 
within the borders of California. One particular security breach demonstrates 
this in operation. ChoicePoint suffered a data breach in 2004 affecting nearly 
145,000 people.215 Initially, it reported that breach to Californians only, as the 
law required.216 However, some soon began inquiring whether the Atlanta-
based national operator suffered a breach that targeted only Californians. 
Faced with this pressure, ChoicePoint voluntarily issued a nationwide notice to 
all Americans whose information had been breached.217 ChoicePoint’s 
notification also resulted in a federal enforcement action by the Federal Trade 
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Commission. ChoicePoint, a provider of credit reporting services, had violated 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) by allowing access to some 163,000 
consumer reports to persons who were not duly authorized to receive 
access.218 By 2005, the California breach notification law had unleashed a 
“wave” of additional reported security breaches in the state.219 Notifications in 
California alerted consumers nationally of breaches that may affect them, and 
dozens of other states rapidly began adopting their own notification laws in a 
textbook de jure California Effect. 220 Today, all fifty states have enacted data 
security breach notification laws.221 The laws that followed California’s not 
only copied, but also both expanded222 and contracted223 California’s model. 
And in 2018, the GDPR introduced security breach notification into European 
law.224  
States thus have a history of following California law in this policy space. 
And California may be seen as an expert jurisdiction on digital data policy for 
other reasons. If a state legislature is going to copy another state and wants to 
strike a balance between individual rights and business needs, California law 
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represents an appealingly pre-packaged compromise, as the state that houses 
both Silicon Valley industry and a generally liberal electorate. 
Second, we believe states may be copying California because they presume 
that the CCPA will create a “Brussels Effect” of de facto compliance, 
originating in California. Lawmakers in other states should anticipate that 
companies are less likely to oppose a bill if it tracks the contours of a 
California law they must obey already. Even though the CCPA protects only 
California residents, companies may find it hard to partition that data, or may 
calculate the cost is low enough to extend their compliance infrastructure to 
consumers in other states. 
Third, compared to the GDPR, the CCPA is a better legal meme for U.S. 
legislators.225 The GDPR contains 99 Articles and 173 Recitals, and it 
harnesses an existing complex regulatory system against the backdrop of 
European court decisions and constitutional doctrine. The GDPR is long, 
complicated, and foreign. The CCPA’s relative brevity and simplicity,226 
however, likely make it more appealing to state legislatures. A state could only 
“copy” the GDPR after condensing it and transposing it into an American 
legal setting. A state can copy the CCPA simply by cutting and pasting. 
Fourth, while not directly catalyzing U.S. privacy law, the GDPR continues 
to play an important role. For the most part the GDPR has not had a (de jure) 
“California Effect” on the U.S. federal government or U.S. states, but it has 
had a (de facto) “Brussels Effect” on companies operating in U.S. 
jurisdictions. This may lower the resistance of global companies to both state 
and U.S. data privacy law. Of course, many of the companies most affected by 
the GDPR were already shouldering regulatory costs under the prior Data 
Protection Directive. Perhaps the number of companies affected by European 
law has gone up, because of its more explicit extraterritorial reach. Or perhaps 
more companies are now taking EU law seriously, given the greatly increased 
penalties they risk. 
A clear example of this dynamic is the proposed Washington Privacy Act 
that failed in 2019.227 This bill had more similarities with the GDPR than other 
state legislation.228 It used GDPR terminology such as “controller” and 
“processor.”229 It would have established “GDPR lite” requirements for 
notice, access, correction, deletion, and restriction of processing requirements, 
and would have imported aspects of the EU concept of lawful processing.230 
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Unlike other proposed state laws, the Washington bill included privacy risk 
assessments, another idea borrowed from the GDPR.231 It even drew on the 
GDPR’s limitations on automated decision-making.232  
The key to understanding why the Washington proposal borrowed so 
many elements of the GDPR may be one of the state’s largest companies: 
Microsoft.233 Microsoft declares that it complies with the GDPR worldwide.234 
With over 45,000 employees in the Seattle area, Microsoft is a significant voice 
in the state.235 And the company actively promoted adoption of the 
Washington statute. Microsoft President Brad Smith described it as “build[ing] 
on the best aspects of approaches elsewhere.”236 In introducing the bill, 
Washington Chief Privacy Officer Alex Alben tellingly explained that 
“companies that already comply with Europe’s General Data Protection 
Regulation… shouldn’t have a hard time complying with the proposed law in 
Washington.”237 The Brussels Effect on Microsoft may be driving it to push 
for state privacy legislation that more closely maps on to the GDPR and thus 
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does not raise regulatory costs for Microsoft—but may raise regulatory costs 
for non-GDPR-compliant local competitors. Microsoft also gains by assuring 
users that their information is well-protected, with legal sanctions for failures. 
The state’s other digital tech giant, Amazon, soon joined in support of the bill. 
After sailing through the state senate by a vote of 46-1, the Washington bill 
foundered amid controversy. After portions of the original legislation were 
stripped out, the state ACLU opposed the bill as too weak.238 Critics objected 
that the bill’s departure from elements of the GDPR, especially in its 
enforcement mechanisms, would make it ineffective; they also complained that 
industry lobbyists had too much influence over a legislative process they 
considered opaque.239 The bill’s sponsor reintroduced it in 2020 with a broader 
coalition of companies and organizations in support. Microsoft’s chief privacy 
officer, former FTC commissioner Julie Brill, has signaled that the company 
will continue to support legislation modeled at least loosely on the GDPR, 
declaring, “We believe privacy is a fundamental human right.”240 
This story of the Washington Privacy Act displays, the GDPR’s Brussels 
Effect in action. But again, it also underscores the power of norm 
entrepreneurs. A global company such as Microsoft has good reason to want 
to impose costs on its competitors while coming off as a good actor. Brill, too, 
may be playing a role as a former FTC commissioner bringing in compliance 
norms from a U.S. government agency. 
Finally, the GDPR may be playing an important framing role in policy 
discussions, acting to rhetorically normalize and ground current conversations 
around data privacy. The publicity accompanying the advent of the GDPR 
may have stoked American public interest in data privacy. The GDPR may be 
leading U.S. citizens—including the North Dakota legislator mentioned 
above241—to wonder why EU persons get stronger privacy rights than they do, 
and to question the longstanding narrative that imposing digital privacy 
regulation will break the internet or otherwise kill innovation. 
Some may doubt the sincerity of California as a privacy regulator. Data 
protection rules, critics will observe, encumber some of its leading 
corporations. These corporations will hobble any real regulatory enforcement 
by the state, the critics will argue. But California’s economy is far bigger than 
Silicon Valley alone. Of course, diffuse voices fare poorly against actors with 
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concentrated interests, as Mancur Olson observed.242 But Mary Stone Ross, 
Alastair MacTaggart, and others demonstrated that California’s initiative 
process could be leveraged to tap into a widely shared desire to protect privacy 
that could overcome even concentrated industry opposition. Indeed, the same 
group now seeks to further strengthen California’s law, again using the 
initiative as a leverage tool.243 Vogel argues that the California Effect requires 
that “nonstate actors in rich and powerful political jurisdictions prefer stronger 
regulatory standards.”244 Content-based industries based in Los Angeles have 
long complained about how Silicon Valley enterprises are insufficiently 
attentive to intellectual property piracy. The CCPA’s principal authors both 
represent districts bordering Los Angeles. Many Silicon Valley enterprises 
themselves support data privacy regulations, though some suggest that the 
support is a strategic effort to undermine California’s privacy law with a 
weaker, preemptive federal law.245 There is a reason for responsible Silicon 
Valley enterprises to embrace privacy law. Silicon Valley enterprises depend on 
user confidence that revealing more and more of themselves to our electronic 
assistants will not create privacy risks. Companies that violate that trust 
undermine trust for other companies as well.246 Ultimately, whether either 
Californians or those outside the state trust the state’s privacy regulators will 
depend on their performance.247 
We close this section with a note on the limits of our knowledge. There are 
many more individual norm entrepreneurs at work here in the spread of the 
CCPA to other states, and the federal response to it. The Uniform Law 
Commission’s new project to draft model state legislation represents one of 
the most formal such networks: its commissioners from every state 
consciously seek to replicate successful innovations across state boundaries in 
a uniform way. Senator Wyden, for example, has been a privacy advocate for 
years, and may be taking advantage of current dynamics to push for changes to 
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federal law. Civil society groups such as the Center for Democracy and 
Technology (CDT) have proposed discussion legislation in hopes of 
influencing the federal debate.248 The North Dakota legislator who watched a 
GDPR documentary, too, can be characterized as a norm entrepreneur. David 
Hoffman at Intel Corporation, characterized as a longtime “industry leader on 
privacy,” developed a draft federal proposal that Intel released for 
comments.249 These stories likely represent the tip of a very large iceberg of 
individuals and knowledge networks working to harness existing forces to 
propagate new law. 
This suggests the early growth of what we call “catalysis networks.” Paul 
Schwartz has noted the existence of “harmonization networks” (a term coined 
by Anne-Marie Slaughter) in privacy law—networks of “regulators in different 
countries [that] work together to harmonize or otherwise adjust different kinds 
of domestic law.”250 What we are seeing here, however, is not solely attempts 
by various actors to harmonize U.S. and EU law on the ground (although it is 
certainly in the interest of global companies to minimize disparities). We 
predict that we are seeing the emergence of both individuals and networks 
taking advantage of the moment to drive both broader geographic coverage 
and perhaps new forms of law. 
In one version of this story, the CCPA becomes not just a catalyst, but a 
floor of protection nationwide. There are certainly plenty of reasons to believe 
this might be the case. We turn now, however, to several very real potential 
constraints on Californian catalysis. 
 
D. Constraints on Californian Catalysis 
 
There are at least three possible constraints on the nationwide spread of 
CCPA-like privacy law. First, the complex relationship between state and 
federal sovereignty in the U.S. constitutional order interacts substantially with 
the ability of state laws like the CCPA to operate or spread nationally. Both the 
dormant commerce clause and potential federal preemption of state law could 
limit the reach of state law and the catalytic effect of the CCPA.251 Second, 
while it is beyond the scope of this Article to address these arguments at 
length, recent First Amendment doctrine may create problems for the CCPA 
and similar laws. Finally, we note the possibility that new models, notably 
including “trust” or “fiduciary” concepts, will take root and out-race both the 
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GDPR and the CCPA to become the dominant catalyst for new privacy law. 
 
1. The Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
 Because internet regulation inevitably extends spills over jurisdictional 
lines, the dormant commerce clause plays an important role in disciplining any 
state’s internet regulation. As the Supreme Court has explained, “By 
prohibiting States from discriminating against or imposing excessive burdens 
on interstate commerce without congressional approval, [the dormant 
commerce clause] strikes at one of the chief evils that led to the adoption of 
the Constitution, namely, state tariffs and other laws that burdened interstate 
commerce.”252 The dormant commerce clause imposes two separate 
conditions on regulatory spillovers: (1) the regulation at issue must not 
discriminate against interstate commerce253 and (2) it must not impose 
excessive burdens on interstate commerce.254 The Supreme Court has offered a 
general principle: “Where [a] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”255  
Early cases challenging state internet regulation on commerce clause 
grounds met with some success. Among the first was a 1997 decision in 
American Library Association v. Pataki, overturning a New York statute that 
prohibited the transmission of obscene content to minors..256 Into the early 
21st century, a number of courts followed the lead of Pataki when evaluating 
similar statutes..257 However, courts in other contexts have departed from 
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Pataki’s approach, upholding, for example, state anti-spam statutes against 
commerce clause challenges.258 A California appeals court “reject[ed] 
Pataki's holding that any State regulation of Internet use violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause.”259 
A federal district court case from California seems particularly relevant 
because it considered a dorman commerce clause challenge to an earlier 
California privacy law. In 2014, two Californians filed a class action against 
Omni Hotels, alleging a violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, a 
1967 statute that makes it illegal to record a conversation without consent of 
both parties. Omni Hotels had set up its call center in Nebraska, and complied 
fully with Nebraska law. Nebraska offered “an employer friendly law that 
exempts business from state wiretap statutes and gives employers the right to 
intercept, disclose and use emails in the ordinary course of business.”260 Omni 
argued that practically speaking, it would have to notify all callers to its 
customer service about the recording, not just Californians, and that this thus 
constituted a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.261 The court decided 
that the California law did not discriminate against out-of-state providers, and 
went on to consider whether the statute unduly burdened interstate commerce. 
It concluded, “[o]verall, the Court finds that the interests of California in the 
privacy of its consumers would be affected more by the application of 
Nebraska law than Nebraska's pro-business interests would be affected by the 
application of California law.”262 If Omni had prevailed, then Nebraska would 
have, wittingly or not, created the ideal conditions for a privacy race to the 
bottom: locate your call center in Nebraska and ignore privacy laws in the 
other jurisdictions where your callers reside. The district court’s ruling avoids 
that result. 
The CCPA does not appear to facially discriminate against interstate 
commerce.263 The statute is written broadly to cover all businesses that deal 
with the private information of California residents, regardless of where they 
are located. As long as the California attorney general does not enforce the law 
 
258 Washington v. Heckel 24 P.3d 404, 413 (Wash. 2001); Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 
115 Cal. Rptr.2d 258, 268 (Cal. App. 2002). 
259 Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 94 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1264, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 265 
(2002), as modified (Jan. 14, 2002). 
260 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
261 Ades v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Omni 
asserts that because the portability of mobile phone numbers makes it unfeasible to distinguish 
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262 Id. 
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against foreign companies in a discriminatory fashion, the CCPA would likely 
survive at least this prong of the doctrine. 
The more realistic potential basis for a challenge would be the contention 
that the CCPA poses an “excessive burden” on interstate commerce. While it 
is possible that enforcement of the CCPA would occur in a manner that leads 
to such an excessive burden, a federal court may well conclude that the 
important interests at stake justified the CCPA’s reasonable interventions 
across state lines. While businesses will complain of heightened compliance 
costs (as Omni complained of the California recording law), California’s 
interests in protecting its residents’ privacy may well justify those additional 
costs (as the court concluded in the Omni litigation). If nothing else, the 
resulting uncertainty may deter other states from following the CCPA’s lead, at 
least until any Commerce Clause challenge is resolved.  
 
2. Preemption 
The CCPA could face another federalism-based challenge to its catalytic 
effect on other states, coming not from the courts but from Congress. While 
state laws may be preempted when compliance with both state and federal 
mandates is impossible,264 the current lack of comprehensive federal privacy 
law makes this unlikely in the case of the CCPA. In many domains, however, 
Congress has adopted federal statutes that explicitly preempt state law in the 
same area, thus establishing uniform national standards on a topic.265 A new 
federal statute with an express preemption clause could unravel the CCPA and 
any potential imitators at the state level. The sudden support of many industry 
groups for federal privacy law is likely motivated by the desire for just this 
outcome.266 
Who should regulate privacy in the United States? Should states regulate 
privacy, should the federal government, or should both? There are thoughtful 
arguments for federal preemption of stricter state regulation, but we conclude 
that, on balance, the federal government should establish a national minimum, 
not a national maximum, for data privacy. This is what William Buzbee has 
called “floor preemption,” allowing a one-way ratchet for standards—
 
264 See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).  
265 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (federal preemption provision of Copyright Act); 21 U.S.C. § 
343-1 (preempting state law concerning food labeling); 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (federal preemption 
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Values , 71 B.U. L. REV. 685, 700 (1991). 
266 Writing of this dynamic in other contexts, Rick Hills explains this apparent 
contradiction: “[F]ederal regulation frequently results from lobbying efforts by industry 
interests that oppose regulation. The apparent paradox of this statement dissolves when one 
takes into account industry’s desire for uniformity of regulation.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., 
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
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upwards—across the United States.267 In fact, preemption may be the issue 
that kills proposed federal data privacy law as powerful Californians and 
Democrats line up against industry and Republicans. House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi has vowed not to support any federal privacy law that provides fewer 
protections than the CCPA, or indeed that preempts state law at all.268, 
Meanwhile, industry will be less interested in any federal law if it would not 
supersede the CCPA. 
There are virtues of a single national standard.269 A national privacy law 
would establish a standard across the region—rather than promising higher or 
lower protections depending on where a person is, or where her data is 
processed or held.270 It makes cross-border data flows across the United States 
a process that does not require legal review. It avoids the possibility of 
inconsistent mandates—inconsistent notice requirements for example. The 
same service or product could be introduced nationwide, as long as it complies 
with the national standard. There seems to be little reason to expect that data 
standards should vary across the country; it would be difficult to explain 
stricter limits on data collection and use in California than Colorado, or vice 
versa. Compliance costs would go down with only one legal standard. 
But a federal preemption ceiling raises substantial concerns. It risks 
establishing a minimal level of privacy—one lower than that a state such as 
California could have demanded. Second, it may reduce existing enforcement 
capacity and expertise by sidelining state Attorneys General who currently 
engage in significant enforcement of data privacy and data security law.271 
States have a long history of regulating privacy, much of it developed through 
the common law.272 As Peter Swire has documented, existing federal privacy 
legislation generally serves as a regulatory floor, not a ceiling,  including post-
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1996 sector-specific preemption provisions adopted since the mid-1990s.273 
Buzbee observes that “in most areas focused on regulation of risks, such as 
discrimination and efforts to enhance public welfare through regulation of 
environmental and occupational risks, the protective ‘one way ratchet’ of floor 
preemption has been the legislative and regulatory norm.”274 Most importantly, 
a federal preemption ceiling risks losing the regulatory innovation that 
continued state legislation in the area might supply.275  
New federal privacy law could provide a nationwide floor, permitting 
states to intervene only to the extent that they raise privacy standards further. 
This allows state innovations and experimentation. Writing of an earlier 
narrow California law that permits minors to delete certain information they 
uploaded to internet sites, Heather Gerken and James Dawson argue that “[i]f 
the experiment proves workable, California’s ’eraser’ law may serve as a model 
for future regulation; if the experiment fails, policy-makers will be all the 
wiser.”276 Of course, a national floor sacrifices the uniformity of a single 
national standard, increasing compliance costs. But if any state offers a too-
strict privacy rule—one that is too difficult to comply with given its business 
model—a corporation might simply refuse to provide it the relevant product 
or service.  
Yet an additional option, raised previously by Paul Schwartz, might be a 
Clean Air Act model for data privacy: Congress could designate California as a 
kind of superregulator, granting it the exclusive right to deviate upwards from 
the federal privacy standard.277 This would allow California alone the 
opportunity to innovate in the area, and permit other states to choose either 
California’s or the federal government’s rules. It would lower regulatory 
compliance costs, but preserve some room for upward regulation. However, it 
would forego the possibility of experimentation in other states, which might 
regulate differently, more clearly, or more stringently than California.278 For 
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example, this approach would destroy the prospect of a new “trust” model 
emerging from legislation such as the bill proposed in New York. 
Regulating in the face of substantial uncertainty will require a dynamic 
approach. Because of the pace of change in data gathering and processing, 
information privacy is a study in surprising turns. Data can be used in 
unexpected ways; its benefits and drawbacks are yet to be fully discovered. The 
last handful of years have brought us tracking pixels, facial recognition, deep 
fakes, robot dogs, and even omnipresent satellites.279 If a federal bill ossifies 
the rules, we may not be able to generate the regulations needed for yet more 
surprising turns. Of course, the federal government is capable of more agile 
versions of governance such as collaborative governance or responsive 
regulation, including through a regulatory agency like the FTC.280  
If a federal law preempts state information privacy law, the CCPA might 
be lost to history. Yet it would have served a critical role: prompting an 
omnibus federal privacy law for the first time since the dawn of the internet 
age. As Gerken and Dawson observe, “By creating a spillover, a single 
innovative state can put an item on the national agenda even if nearly everyone 
else—Congress, interest groups, and other states—would prefer that the issue 
go away.”281 This would be a significant and long-lasting California Effect, 
indeed.  
 
3. The First Amendment 
 
Another potentially significant constraint on the enactment of state and 
federal laws, and indeed the survival of the CCPA, is the First Amendment. 
Discussed above in the context of the differing regulatory settings of the EU 
and United States, the First Amendment potentially poses constraints on 
drafters of U.S. privacy law. While in-depth coverage of these constraints—
and their limitations—is outside of this Article’s scope, we outline a few basic 
concepts here. 
 
279 Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya, & Jonathan Frankle, Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police 
Face Recognition in America, https://www.perpetuallineup.org/; Ry Crist, Yes, the Robot Dog Ate 
Your Privacy, CNET, June 28, 2019 8:21 am PDT, https://www.cnet.com/news/yes-the-robot-
dog-ate-your-privacy/; Christopher Beam, Soon, Satellites Will Be Able to Watch You Everywhere 
All the Time, TECH. REV. (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/613748/satellites-threaten-privacy/. 
280 Charles Sabel and his coauthors argue for the virtue of a “rolling rule regime” where 
“regulators use reports on proposals and outcomes to periodically reformulate minimum 
performance standards, desirable targets, and paths for moving from the former to the latter.” 
SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 7 (2000). See also Dennis D. Hirsch, 
Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons it Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 83 (2013); McGeveran, supra note 14; Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based 
Consumer Law, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309 (2015). 
281 Heather K. Gerken & James T. Dawson, Living Under Someone Else's Law, 36 
DEMOCRACY J. 42, 46 (2015). 
54 Catalyzing Privacy Law  
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech. It also protects 
expressive activity (speech mixed with action), and penumbral activity 
necessary for speech to take place (such as the placement of newspaper kiosks 
to distribute newspapers, or the purchase of pen and paper).282 A series of First 
Amendment cases on public records established significant limitations on laws 
restricting the distribution of lawfully obtained information.283 More recently, 
the Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to find unconstitutional 
a Vermont law regulating the sale of prescription drug user data.284 And in 
2018, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional a series of disclosure 
requirements aimed at protecting women patients from pro-life organizations 
posing as abortion providers.285  
Recently, the expansive coverage and protection of First Amendment 
doctrine has led some to decry its potential deregulatory effects.286 On the 
other hand, privacy scholars have noted that the First Amendment provides 
arguments for effective privacy law, as a lack of privacy can chill free 
expression.287 Commentators broadly disagree on how much of data privacy 
law might survive First Amendment challenges.288 Through court challenges or 
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through its expanding cultural penumbra, the First Amendment thus may chill 
the spread of the CCPA.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
What does all of this mean for our privacy? The end result of the race 
between the GDPR and the CCPA may well be a hybrid of both. The effective 
privacy law governing global corporations will be the strictest aspects of both 
California and European law—a figurative, but not literal, highest common 
denominator.289 Corporations operating across the Atlantic will find 
themselves comporting with both regimes simultaneously, rather than 
configuring their services or offerings by jurisdiction. Call this hybrid the 
“CDPR”—the CCPA + the GDPR. “Under [the CCPA], the attorney general 
of California will become the chief privacy officer of the United States of 
America,” Alastair Mactaggart declared.290 
But this de facto reality only goes so far. Those outside either jurisdiction 
will not be able to assert those rights directly with either regulators or courts. 
Both regimes grant rights only to their own residents. For example, the much 
embattled facial recognition company Clearview provides only Californians 
and European Union residents the opportunity to opt out.291 Within the 
United States, the CCPA will yet continue to drive both businesses and 
legislatures. The CCPA, both de facto and de jure, will likely call the tune for 
the march of a new American data privacy spreading to other jurisdictions. 
California has emerged as the superregulator of U.S. privacy law. 
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